Cited by 1,073Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

Nobody's watching?

Haley, Kevin J., Fessler, Daniel M.T.·2005·Evolution and Human Behavior

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.01.002

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8 of 8 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The hypothesis that more information leads to more cooperation has been confirmed in experiments which compare three information conditions.

    “The hypothesis that more information leads to more cooperation has been confirmed in experiments which compare three information conditions 61 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [61]

  • The additional knowledge (about the score of the recipient of the co-player) did enhance cooperation.

    “But the additional knowledge did enhance cooperation 61 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [61]

  • Several experiments show that even players who know that their score will not be communicated show generous behaviour.

    “But several experiments show that even players who know that their score will not be communicated show generous behaviour 61,63 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [61]

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Authors
Haley, K. J., & Fessler, D. M. T.
Affiliations
University of California, Los Angeles (US)
Corresponding author
Haley, Kevin J.
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2005-05
Volume
26
Issue
3
Pages
245-256
ISSN
1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2044237036
Cited by
1,073
References
8
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 52 · 2019: 52 · 2018: 56 · 2017: 68 · 2016: 75 · 2015: 93 · 2014: 66 · 2013: 81 · 2012: 85
FWCI
80.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Evolution and Human Behavior (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
reputation formation, prosocial behavior, cooperation, dictator game, anonymity, eyespots, auditory cues, visual cues, intuitive judgment, generosity

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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