The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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Cites
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games
Aumann, R. J. (1959) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), Volume IV · doi:10.1515/9781400882168-018 · Cited by 886
Benoit, J.-P., & Krishna, V. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912660 · Cited by 516
Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
Rubinstein, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90002-4 · Cited by 456
Aumann, R. J. (1981) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 244
Essays in game theory and mathematical economics in honor of Oskar Morgenstern
Morgenstern, O., & Aumann, R. J. (1981) · Bibliographisches Institut eBooks · Cited by 188
Long-Term Competition—A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Aumann, R. J., & Shapley, L. S. (1994) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_1 · Cited by 187
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
Smale, S. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911925 · Cited by 146
Repeated Games with Complete Information
Gossner, O., & Tomala, T. (2011) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-1800-9_161 · Cited by 10
Cited by
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
Radner, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951495 · Cited by 699
Modeling Rational Players: Part II
Binmore, K. (1988) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267100000328 · Cited by 346
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277
Tennenholtz, M. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.002 · Cited by 52
Metadata
- Authors
- Neyman, A.
- Venue
- Economics Letters
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1985-01
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 227-229
- ISSN
- 0165-1765 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2049538756
- Cited by
- 344
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 9.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90026-6
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- Neyman, A. (1985). Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Economics Letters. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90026-6
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.