Evolutionary stability and social norms
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Self-interested behavior need not earn higher material payoffs than norm-guided behavior in strategic environments in which a recognized adherence to social norms can help solve the commitment problem. This insight can provide the basis for an evolutionary theory of social norms. If the composition of behaviors evolves under pressure of differential payoffs, a population consisting exclusively of optimizers may be unstable, and there may exist a multiplicity of attractors representing a variety of stable norms. Societies facing similar material conditions may therefore come to adopt distinct norms as a result of chance events or differences in initial conditions.
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Cites
Fairness and the assumptions of economics
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296367 · Cited by 2,463
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Cited by
Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
Carpenter, J. P. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.011 · Cited by 390
The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2011) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms1442 · Cited by 350
Metadata
- Authors
- Sethi, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-01
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 113-140
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1969845801
- Cited by
- 71
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 8.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Sethi, R. (1996). Evolutionary stability and social norms. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(95)00053-4
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