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Information, Irrationality and the Evolution of Trust

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Measuring the Distribution of SpitefulnessPreprint

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Sadism, the Intuitive System, and Antisocial Punishment in the Public Goods Game

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Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games

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The Cooperative PhenotypePreprint

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Nonlinear eco-evolutionary games with global environmental fluctuations and local environmental feedbacks

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Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments

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Self-reliance crowds out group cooperation and increases wealth inequality

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Combined effect of pure punishment and reward in the public goods game

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Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game

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Why People Punish in Public Goods Games, and on Whom Punishment is Most Effective: Conventional Wisdoms ReconsideredPreprint

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Punishment Does Not Promote Cooperation Under Exploration Dynamics When Anti-Social Punishment is Possible

Hauser, O., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.041 · Cited by 67 · see citing works

Leaving the loners alone: Evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment

García, J. A., & Traulsen, A. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.05.011 · Cited by 58 · see citing works

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Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishmentPreprint

Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2017) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/198192 · Cited by 56 · see citing works