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Cited by 396

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Ultimatum bargaining behavior

Güth, Werner, Tietz, Reinhard·1990·Journal of Economic Psychology
DOI 10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-z
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Research works printed but not linked: 19

  1. Binmore, 1985, Testing noncooperative bargaining theory: A preliminary study, American Economic Review, 75, 1178
  2. Binmore, 1988, A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory: Reply, American Economic Review, 78, 837
  3. Brandstatter, 1988, Sechzehn Persönlichkeits-Adjektivskalen (16PA) als Forschungsinstrument anstelle des 16PF, Zeitschrift für experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 35, 370
  4. Fudenberg, 1986, The fold theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information, Econometrica, 54, 533, 10.2307/1911307 · DOI · Paper page
  5. Güth, 1988, Ultimatum bargaining for a shrinking cake—An experimental analysis, Vol. 314, 111
  6. Güth, 1982, An experimental study of ultimatum bargaining, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations, 3, 367, 10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7 · DOI
  7. Harrison, 1989, An experimental evaluation of weakest link-best shot models of public goods, Journal of Political Economy, 97, 201, 10.1086/261598 · DOI
  8. Hoffman, 1982, The coase theorem: Some experimental tests, Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 73, 10.1086/467008 · DOI
  9. Hoffman, 1985, Entitlements, rights and fairness: An Experimental examination of subjects' concepts of distributive justice, Journal of Legal Studies, 14, 259, 10.1086/467773 · DOI
  10. Kahneman, 1986, Fairness as a constraint on profit-seeking: Entitlements in the market, American Economic Review, 76, 728
  11. Kahneman, 1986, Fairness and the assumptions of economics, Journal of Business, 59, 285, 10.1086/296367 · DOI · Paper page
  12. Mikula, 1973, Gewinnaufteilungsverhalten in Dyaden bei variierten Leistungsverhältnis, Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 3, 126
  13. Neelin, 1988, A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory: Comment, American Economic Review, 78, 824
  14. Ochs, 1989, An experimental study of sequential bargaining, The American Economic Review, 79, 355
  15. Rubinstein, 1982, Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica, 50, 97, 10.2307/1912531 · DOI
  16. Selten, 1975, Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25, 10.1007/BF01766400 · DOI
  17. Thaler, 1988, Anomalies: The ultimatum game, The Journal of Economic Perspective, 2, 195, 10.1257/jep.2.4.195 · DOI
  18. Vickrey, 1961, Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance, 16, 8, 10.2307/2977633 · DOI
  19. Weg, 1990, Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon, Games and Economic Behavior, 2, 76, 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90015-M · DOI · Paper page

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Metadata

Authors
Güth, W., & Tietz, R.
Venue
Journal of Economic Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1990-09
Volume
11
Issue
3
Pages
417-449
ISSN
0167-4870
DOI
10.1016/0167-4870(90)90021-z
Cited by
396
References
0
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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