The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs
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Citations
Cites
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
Akerlof, G. A. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885667 · Cited by 1,648
Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns
Clotfelter, C. T. (1983) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1924181 · Cited by 1,002
Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis
Yitzhaki, S. (1974) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(74)90037-1 · Cited by 944
Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion
Gordon, J. P. P. (1989) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(89)90026-3 · Cited by 405
A simulation study of income tax evasion
Friedland, N., Maital, S., & Rutenberg, A. (1978) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(78)90008-7 · Cited by 387
Cowell, F. A., & P.F. Gordon, J. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90013-8 · Cited by 216
BALDRY, J. C. (1986) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(86)90092-3 · Cited by 165
On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion
Yitzhaki, S. (1987) · Public Finance Quarterly · doi:10.1177/109114218701500201 · Cited by 154
Inflation and Tax Evasion: An Empirical Analysis
Crane, S. E., & Nourzad, F. (1986) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925500 · Cited by 148
Cited by
The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance
Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., & Vlaev, I. (2017) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.003 · Cited by 764
Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising
Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00040-9 · Cited by 740
Alm, J. (2012) · International Tax and Public Finance · doi:10.1007/s10797-011-9171-2 · Cited by 621
Do Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and Morality
Alm, J., & Torgler, B. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0761-9 · Cited by 607
WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE?
Alm, J. (2019) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12272 · Cited by 442
Metadata
- Authors
- Myles, G. D., & Naylor, R. A.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1996-04
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 49-66
- ISSN
- 0176-2680 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2042469752
- Cited by
- 319
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 9.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0176-2680(95)00037-2
- The paper
- Myles, G. D., & Naylor, R. A. (1996). A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs. European Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1016/0176-2680(95)00037-2
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.