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Cited by 2,663

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Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas

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Carey, John M, Shugart, Matthew Soberg·1995·Electoral Studies

Abstract

Seat allocation formulas affect candidates' incentives to campaign on a personal rather than party reputation. Variables that enhance personal vote-seeking include: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. District magnitude has the unusual feature that, as it increases, the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.

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Metadata

Authors
Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S.
Venue
Electoral Studies
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1995-12
Volume
14
Issue
4
Pages
417-439
ISSN
0261-3794 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1995643388
Cited by
2,663
References
0
FWCI
41.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2
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Carey, J. M., & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies. https://doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2

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