The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes
Abstract
In elections around the world, large numbers of voters are influenced by promises or threats that are contingent on how they vote. Recently, the political science literature has made considerable progress in disaggregating clientelism along two dimensions: first, in recognizing the diversity of actors working as brokers, and second, in conceptualizing and disaggregating types of clientelism based on positive and negative inducements of different forms. In this review, we discuss recent findings explaining variation in the mix of clientelistic strategies across countries, regions, and individuals and identify a few areas for future progress, particularly in explaining variation in targeting of inducements by politicians on different types of voters.
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Cites
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Cited by
United we stand, divided we rule: how political polarization erodes democracy
Arbatli, E., & Rosenberg, D. (2021) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1818068 · Cited by 146
Election turnout in authoritarian regimes
Martinez i Coma, F., & Morgenbesser, L. (2020) · Electoral Studies · doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102222 · Cited by 44
Metadata
- Authors
- Mares, I., & Young, L.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2016-05-11
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 267-288
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W1803395564
- Cited by
- 332
- References
- 76
- FWCI
- 56.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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