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Cited by 751

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Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures

Open access
Comment, Robert, Schwert, G.William·1995·Journal of Financial Economics
DOI 10.1016/0304-405x(94)00823-j
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Abstract

This paper provides large-sample evidence that poison pill rights issues, control share laws, and business combination laws have not systematically deterred takeovers and are unlikely to have caused the demise of the 1980s market for corporate control, even though 87% of all exchange-listed firms are now covered by one of these antitakeover measures. We show that poison pills and control share laws are reliably associated with higher takeover premiums for selling shareholders, both unconditionally and conditional on a successful takeover, and we provide updated event study evidence for the three-quarters of all poison pills not yet analyzed. Antitakeover measures increase the bargaining position of target firms, but they do not prevent many transactions.

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Metadata

Authors
Comment, R., & Schwert, G. W.
Venue
Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1995-09
Volume
39
Issue
1
Pages
3-43
ISSN
0304-405X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/0304-405x(94)00823-j
OpenAlex
W3121176210
Cited by
751
References
0
FWCI
75.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00823-j
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Comment, R., & Schwert, G. W. (1995). Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00823-j

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.