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Cited by 1,529Social Capital and NetworksSocial Policy and Reform StudiesCorruption and Economic Development

All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust

Open access
Rothstein, Bo, Uslaner, Eric M.·2005·World Politics
DOI 10.1353/wp.2006.0022
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Abstract

The importance of social trust has become widely accepted in the social sciences. A number of explanations have been put forward for the stark variation in social trust among countries. Among these, participation in voluntary associations received most attention. Yet there is scant evidence that participation can lead to trust. In this article, the authors examine a variable that has not gotten the attention it deserves in the discussion about the sources of generalized trust, namely, equality. They conceptualize equality along two dimensions: economic equality and equality of opportunity. The omission of both these dimensions of equality in the social capital literature is peculiar for several reasons. First, it is obvious that the countries that score highest on social trust also rank highest on economic equality, namely, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada. Second, these countries have put a lot of effort in creating equality of opportunity, not least in regard to their policies for public education, health care, labor market opportunities, and (more recently) gender equality. The argument for increasing social trust by reducing inequality has largely been ignored in the policy debates about social trust. Social capital research has to a large extent been used by several governments and policy organizations to send a message to people that the bad things in their society are caused by too little volunteering. The policy implications that follow from the authors' research is that the low levels of trust and social capital that plague many countries are caused by too little government action to reduce inequality. However, many countries with low levels of social trust and social capital may be stuck in what is known as asocial trap. The logic of such a situation is the following. Social trust will not increase because massive social inequality prevails, but the public policies that could remedy this situation cannot be established precisely because there is a genuine lack of trust. This lack of trust concerns both “other people” and the government institutions that are needed to implement universal policies.

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Eric M. Uslaner, "Fel! Endast huvuddokument.The Bulging Pocket and the Rule of Law: Corruption, Inequality, and Trust" (Paper presented at the Fel! Endast huvuddokument.conference The Quality of Government: What It Is, How to Get It, Why It Matters, The Quality of Government Institute, Department of Political Science, Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden, November 17-19, 2005), at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/conferences/november2005/papers/Uslaner.pdf . 23 Uslaner (fn 1), 233-236. 24 Uslaner (fn 1), 186-189,
  2. Jong-Sung You, A Comparative Study of Income Inequality, Corruption and Social Trust: How Inequality and Corruption Reinforce Each Other and Erode Social Trust (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005), chap.
  3. Tim Knudsen and Ditlev Tamm (Eds.) Dansk forvaltningshistorie indtil 1901 (Copenhagen: Jurist-og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2000).
  4. Rune Åberg, "Distributive Mechanism of the Welfare State," European Sociological Review 5 (1989).
  5. Sabrina Tavernise, "Russia Is Mostly Unmoved by the Troubles of Its Tycoons," New York Times (Washington edition, November 3, 2003), A3.

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Authors
Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M.
Affiliations
  • University of Gothenburg (SE)
  • University of Maryland, College Park (US)
Venue
World Politics
Publisher
Project MUSE
Published
2005-10
Volume
58
Issue
1
Pages
41-72
ISSN
  • 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
  • 1086-3338
DOI
10.1353/wp.2006.0022
OpenAlex
W2124134613
Cited by
1,529
References
81
Citations by year
2026: 84 · 2025: 122 · 2024: 105 · 2023: 122 · 2022: 96 · 2021: 118 · 2020: 80 · 2019: 74 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 95 · 2016: 82 · 2015: 86 · 2014: 84 · 2013: 67 · 2012: 75
FWCI
59.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 2081 d)
Locations
  • World Politics (publishedVersion)
  • Gothenburg University Publications Electronic Archive (Gothenburg University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Capital and Networks
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Social Policy and Reform Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
Keywords
social trust, generalized trust, economic equality, equal opportunities, social capital, corruption, civil society organizations, social traps, public policy, Nordic countries, gender equality

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