Probability matching in choice under uncertainty: intuition versus deliberation.
Open accessAbstract
Gaissmaier and Schooler (2008) [Gaissmaier, W., & Schooler, L. J. (2008). The smart potential behind probability matching. Cognition, 109, 416-422] argue that probability matching, which has traditionally been viewed as a decision making error, may instead reflect an adaptive response to environments in which outcomes potentially follow predictable patterns. In choices involving monetary stakes, we find that probability matching persists even when it is not possible to identify or exploit outcome patterns and that many "probability matchers" rate an alternative strategy (maximizing) as superior when it is described to them. Probability matching appears to reflect a mistaken intuition that can be, but often is not, overridden by deliberate consideration of alternative choice strategies.
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Probability matching occurs at similar rates whether patterns can be conceivably detected or not.
“This is because probability matching occurs at similar rates whether patterns can be conceivably detected or not (Koehler and James, 2009).”
From Probability matching and statistical naïveté (2025) · cites this paper as Koehler and James, 2009
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The smart potential behind probability matching
Gaissmaier, W., & Schooler, L. J. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.09.007 · Cited by 223 · see citing works
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Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0026450 · Cited by 436 · see citing works
Probability matching and strategy availability
J. Koehler, D., & James, G. (2010) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/mc.38.6.667 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
Self-citationHuman inference in changing environments with temporal structure.
Prat-Carrabin, A., Wilson, R. C., Cohen, J. D., & Azeredo da Silveira, R. (2021) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000276 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
“Decision by posterior sampling, or ‘probability matching’, has been suggested by other decision-making experiments [74, 75, 76] and, more recently, perceptual experiments [77, 2, 41].”
BackgroundProbability matching and statistical naïveté
Barlow, M., Doan, T., Friedman, O., & Denison, S. (2025) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/jdm.2025.10014 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Koehler, D. J., & James, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Waterloo (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Koehler, Derek J.
- ORCID
- Koehler, Derek J.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-10
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 123-127
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2104463177
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 7 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 5.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Keywords
- probability matching, decision making under uncertainty, intuition, deliberation, decision errors, outcome predictability, monetary choice, strategy evaluation, adaptive decision-making
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Choice Behavior, Female, Humans, Judgment, Learning, Male, Probability, Thinking, Intuition, Uncertainty
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