The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What we say and what we do: The relationship between real and hypothetical moral choices
Open accessAbstract
Moral ideals are strongly ingrained within society and individuals alike, but actual moral choices are profoundly influenced by tangible rewards and consequences. Across two studies we show that real moral decisions can dramatically contradict moral choices made in hypothetical scenarios (Study 1). However, by systematically enhancing the contextual information available to subjects when addressing a hypothetical moral problem-thereby reducing the opportunity for mental simulation-we were able to incrementally bring subjects' responses in line with their moral behaviour in real situations (Study 2). These results imply that previous work relying mainly on decontextualized hypothetical scenarios may not accurately reflect moral decisions in everyday life. The findings also shed light on contextual factors that can alter how moral decisions are made, such as the salience of a personal gain.
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Cites
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Empathic concern drives costly altruism
FeldmanHall, O., Dalgleish, T., Evans, D., & Mobbs, D. (2015) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.10.043 · Cited by 349
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Bostyn, D. H., Sevenhant, S., & Roets, A. (2018) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797617752640 · Cited by 276
Autonomous Vehicles Enabled by the Integration of IoT, Edge Intelligence, 5G, and Blockchain
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Metadata
- Authors
- FeldmanHall, O., Mobbs, D., Evans, D., Hiscox, L., Navrady, L., & Dalgleish, T.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-06
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 434-441
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2052316774
- Cited by
- 312
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 5.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ (vor, 410 d)
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.