From self to social cognition: Theory of Mind mechanisms and their relation to Executive Functioning
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
'Theory of Mind' refers to the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This study examined the extent to which 'Self' and 'Other' belief-attribution processes within the Theory of Mind (ToM) mechanism could be distinguished behaviourally, and whether these separable components differentially related to Executive Functioning (EF) abilities. A computerized false-belief task, utilizing a matched-design to allow direct comparison of self-oriented vs. other-oriented belief-attribution, was used to assess ToM, and a face-image Stroop task was employed to assess EF, within a population of typically-developed adults. Results revealed significantly longer reaction times when attributing beliefs to other people as opposed to recognizing and attributing beliefs to oneself. Intriguingly, results revealed that 'perspective-shift' requirements (i.e. changing from adoption of the 'self' perspective to the perspective of the 'other', or vice versa) across false-belief trials influenced reaction times. Reaction times were significantly longer when the perspective shift was from self-to-other than from other-to-self. It is suggested that the 'self' forms the stem of understanding the 'other', and is therefore processed regardless of ultimate task demands; in contrast, the 'other' perspective is only processed when explicitly required. We conclude that adopting another person's perspective, even when their belief state is matched to one's own, requires more cognitive effort than recalling and reflecting on self-oriented belief-states.
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Cites
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. (2000) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1999.0734 · Cited by 15,798
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076512 · Cited by 8,743
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599
Wimmer, H. (1983) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 · Cited by 6,305
The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time
Brewer, M. B. (1991) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167291175001 · Cited by 5,107
Baron‐Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/1469-7610.00715 · Cited by 4,555
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476
Miyake, A., & Friedman, N. P. (2012) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721411429458 · Cited by 3,944 · cited 2×
“Ozonoff et al., 1991; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Sabbagh et al., 2006). In typically developed adults, it has been demonstrated that a heavier cognitive load can influence success on ToM tasks, often resulting in more egocentric errors, supporting the notion of a relationship between ToM and EF (e.g. Bull, Philips, & Con…”
BackgroundFears, phobias, and preparedness: toward an evolved module of fear and fear learning
Öhman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.3.483 · Cited by 3,147 · cited 1×
“Utilizing a within-subjects design, we found that participants were slower identifying emotions than gender in faces, supporting prior findings that affective stimuli are differentially processed compared to non-affective stimuli (e.g. LeDoux, 2000; Ohman & Mineka, 2001).”
ResultDevelopment and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306 · cited 1×
“…demands an otherperson orientation, although additional and specific ‘other-oriented’ mechanisms are also recruited (Decety & Sommerville, 2003); in other words, self-understanding forms a core component of ToM belief-attribution abilities (Hobson, 2010; Happé et al., 1996; Frith & Frith, 2003).”
Background
Cited by
Consensus Paper: Cerebellum and Social Cognition
Van Overwalle, F., Manto, M., Cattaneo, Z., Clausi, S., Ferrari, C., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Guell, X., Heleven, E., Lupo, M., Ma, Q., et al. (2020) · The Cerebellum · doi:10.1007/s12311-020-01155-1 · Cited by 442
Cognitive and Affective Empathy Relate Differentially to Emotion Regulation
Thompson, N. M., van Reekum, C. M., & Chakrabarti, B. (2022) · Affective Science · doi:10.1007/s42761-021-00062-w · Cited by 136
Parental reflective functioning and executive functioning in mothers with substance use disorder
Håkansson, U., Söderström, K., Watten, R., Skårderud, F., & Øie, M. G. (2018) · Attachment & Human Development · doi:10.1080/14616734.2017.1398764 · Cited by 42
Living With Frontotemporal Degeneration: Diagnostic Journey, Symptom Experiences, and Disease Impact
Barker, M. S., Dodge, S. G., Niehoff, D., Denny, S., Dacks, P. A., Dickinson, S., Cosentino, S., & Wheaton, D. K. H. (2023) · Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry and Neurology · doi:10.1177/08919887221119976 · Cited by 17
Metadata
- Authors
- Bradford, E. E. F., Jentzsch, I., & Gomez, J.-C.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-05
- Volume
- 138
- Pages
- 21-34
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2112315896
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 27.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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