Inferences about moral character moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Moral psychology research has highlighted several factors critical for evaluating the morality of another's choice, including the detection of norm-violating outcomes, the extent to which an agent caused an outcome, and the extent to which the agent intended good or bad consequences, as inferred from observing their decisions. However, person-centered accounts of moral judgment suggest that a motivation to infer the moral character of others can itself impact on an evaluation of their choices. Building on this person-centered account, we examine whether inferences about agents' moral character shape the sensitivity of moral judgments to the consequences of agents' choices, and agents' role in the causation of those consequences. Participants observed and judged sequences of decisions made by agents who were either bad or good, where each decision entailed a trade-off between personal profit and pain for an anonymous victim. Across trials we manipulated the magnitude of profit and pain resulting from the agent's decision (consequences), and whether the outcome was caused via action or inaction (causation). Consistent with previous findings, we found that moral judgments were sensitive to consequences and causation. Furthermore, we show that the inferred character of an agent moderated the extent to which people were sensitive to consequences in their moral judgments. Specifically, participants were more sensitive to the magnitude of consequences in judgments of bad agents' choices relative to good agents' choices. We discuss and interpret these findings within a theoretical framework that views moral judgment as a dynamic process at the intersection of attention and social cognition.
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Citations
Cites
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2014.877340 · Cited by 632
The evolution of error: error management, cognitive constraints, and adaptive decision-making biases
Johnson, D. D. P., Blumstein, D. T., Fowler, J. H., & Haselton, M. G. (2013) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2013.05.014 · Cited by 364
Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect Effect: Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment
Leslie, A. M., Knobe, J., & Cohen, A. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01722.x · Cited by 330
Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations
Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x · Cited by 179 · cited 4×
“…work has shown that the well-documented ‘omission bias’, whereby harm brought about by an action is judged worse than harm brought about by a failure to act (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Spranca et al., 1991), can be explained primarily by causal attribution (Cushman & Young, 2011).”
BackgroundInfluentialAssignment of Moral Responsibility and Punishment
Shultz, T. R., Wright, K., & Schleifer, M. (1986) · Child Development · doi:10.2307/1130649 · Cited by 117
Cited by
Principles of moral accounting: How our intuitive moral sense balances rights and wrongs
Johnson, S. G. B., & Ahn, J. (2021) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104467 · Cited by 14
Yu, H., Chen, J., Dardaine, B., & Yang, F. (2023) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105476 · Cited by 13
Protzko, J., & Schooler, J. W. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1025214 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Siegel, J. Z., Crockett, M. J., & Dolan, R. J.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2017-10
- Volume
- 167
- Pages
- 201-211
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2616281214
- Cited by
- 89
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 3.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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