Cited by 990Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryEmotions and Moral Behavior

Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

Cushman, Fiery·2008·Cognition

Abstract

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006

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Authors
Cushman, F.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Cushman, Fiery
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2008-08
Volume
108
Issue
2
Pages
353-380
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2117155762
Cited by
990
References
57
Citations by year
2026: 70 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 68 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 72 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 102 · 2019: 56 · 2018: 58 · 2017: 65 · 2016: 62 · 2015: 47 · 2014: 50 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 42
FWCI
10.16
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
Keywords
moral judgment, blame, punishment, intention, causality, mental states, belief and desire, adverse effects, moral responsibility, permissibility
MeSH terms
Crime, Humans, Judgment, Morals, Punishment, Intention

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