Cited by 179Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryEthics in Business and Education

Patterns of Moral Judgment Derive From Nonmoral Psychological Representations

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Cushman, Fiery, Young, Liane·2011·Cognitive Science

Abstract

Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side-effect (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side-effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations and provide evidence that their role in moral judgment is mediated by these nonmoral psychological representations. Specifically, the action/omission distinction affects moral judgment primarily via causal attribution, while the means/side-effect distinction affects moral judgment via intentional attribution. We suggest that many of the specific patterns evident in our moral judgments in fact derive from nonmoral psychological mechanisms, and especially from the processes of causal and intentional attribution.

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  1. F. Cushman, L. Young ⁄ Cognitive Science 35 (2011) 15516709, 2011, 6, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01167.x by Test, Wiley Online Library on [03/07/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License · DOI
  2. Cushman, F. A. (in press). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. Cognition, 108, 353-380.
  3. Cushman, F. A., & Greene, J. D. (in press). The philosopher in the theater. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Social psychology of morality: The origins of good and evil. Washington, DC: APA Press.
  4. Hart, H. L. A., & Honore, T. (1959). Causation in the law. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
  5. Hauser, M. D., Cushman, F. A., Young, L., Jin, R., & mikhail, J. M. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgment and justification. Mind and Language, 22(1), 1-21.
  6. Hauser, M. D., Young, L., & Cushman, F. A. (2008). Reviving Rawls' linguistic analogy. In W. Sinnott- Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 107-143). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  7. Sperber, D. (1995). Introduction. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A. Premack (Eds.), Causal cognition (pp. xv- xx). Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.

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Authors
Cushman, F., & Young, L.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
Corresponding author
Cushman, Fiery
Venue
Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2011-01-31
Volume
35
Issue
6
Pages
1052-1075
ISSN
0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2133646840
Cited by
179
References
70
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 9
FWCI
7.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
Harvard University
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
Keywords
moral judgment, causal attribution, intentional attribution, killing versus letting die, moral intuitions
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Humans, Judgment, Morals, Social Perception, Intention, Theory of Mind

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