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Cited by 219Free Will and AgencyParanormal Experiences and BeliefsTheology and Philosophy of Evil

The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility

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Nadelhoffer, Thomas, Shepard, Jason, Nahmias, Eddy, Sripada, Chandra, Ross, Lisa Thomson·2014·Consciousness and Cognition
DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.006
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Abstract

In this paper, we present the results of the construction and validation of a new psychometric tool for measuring beliefs about free will and related concepts: The Free Will Inventory (FWI). In its final form, FWI is a 29-item instrument with two parts. Part 1 consists of three 5-item subscales designed to measure strength of belief in free will, determinism, and dualism. Part 2 consists of a series of fourteen statements designed to further explore the complex network of people's associated beliefs and attitudes about free will, determinism, choice, the soul, predictability, responsibility, and punishment. Having presented the construction and validation of FWI, we discuss several ways that it could be used in future research, highlight some as yet unanswered questions that are ripe for interdisciplinary investigation, and encourage researchers to join us in our efforts to answer these questions.

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  • Free will beliefs were measured using the Free Will Inventory (FWI) and the Free Will and Determinism (FWD) personal agency subscale.

    “For the extension, free will beliefs were measured before the replication using two free will belief subscales: Free Will Inventory (FWI) (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) (5 items; 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; = 0.91) and Free Will and Determinism (FWD) personal agency subscale (Rakos et al., 2008) (4 items; 1 = Not true at all, 5 = Almost always true; = 0.92).”

    From Agency and self-other asymmetries in perceived bias and shortcomings: Replications of the Bias Blind Spot and link to free will beliefs (2021) · cites this paper as Nadelhoffer et al., 2014

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Authors
Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., & Ross, L. T.
Affiliations
  • College of Charleston (US)
  • Emory University (US)
  • Georgia State University (US)
  • University of Michigan (US)
Corresponding author
Nadelhoffer, Thomas
ORCID
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2014-04
Volume
25
Pages
27-41
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.006
OpenAlex
W2167987245
Cited by
219
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 20 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 1
FWCI
5.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Keywords
free will, belief in free will, determinism, dualism, agency, moral responsibility, punishment, choice, soul, predictability, psychometric validation
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Aged, 80 and over, Attitude, Factor Analysis, Statistical, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Psychometrics, Punishment, Surveys and Questionnaires, Social Responsibility, Reproducibility of Results, Personal Autonomy, Young Adult

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