Cited by 48Mental Health and PsychiatrySchizophrenia research and treatmentEmbodied and Extended Cognition

The doxastic shear pin: Delusions as errors of learning and memory

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Fineberg, S. K., Corlett, P. R.·2016·Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

Abstract

We reconsider delusions in terms of a "doxastic shear pin", a mechanism that errs so as to prevent the destruction of the machine (brain) and permit continued function (in an attenuated capacity). Delusions may disable flexible (but energetically expensive) inference. With each recall, delusions may be reinforced further and rendered resistant to contradiction. We aim to respond to deficit accounts of delusions - that delusions are only a problem without any benefit - by considering delusion formation and maintenance in terms of predictive coding. We posit that brains conform to a simple computational principle: to minimize prediction error (the mismatch between prior top-down expectation and current bottom-up input) across hierarchies of brain regions and psychological representation. Recent data suggest that delusions may form in the absence of constraining top-down expectations. Then, once formed, they become new priors that motivate other beliefs, perceptions, and actions by providing strong (sometimes overriding) top-down expectation. We argue that delusions form when the shear-pin breaks, permitting continued engagement with an overwhelming world, and ongoing function in the face of paralyzing difficulty. This crucial role should not be ignored when we treat delusions: we need to consider how a person will function in the world without them..

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  • Perceptible social cues may be more uncertain than nonsocial ones, because they may or may not serve as reliable signals of others' intentions, which we can never fully know.

    “Perceptible social cues may be more uncertain than nonsocial ones, because they may or may not serve as reliable signals of others’ intentions, which we can never fully know (111).”

    From The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis (2018) · cites this paper as [111]

    Section VI, “Why this particular belief?” (page unavailable), says that forming beliefs about others involves predicting their actions and that social inference is difficult and computationally intensive. It does not say that perceptible social cues are more uncertain than nonsocial cues, or explain their uncertainty in terms of intentions that can never be fully known. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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  1. Capgras J Reboul-Lachaux J 1923 L’illusion des “soises” dans un delire systematise Bulletin de Society Clinique de Medicine Mentale 11 6 16
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  4. Helmholtz H von 1878/1971 The Facts of Perception Kahl R Selected Writings of Herman von Helmholtz Weslyan University Press
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  7. Kihlstrom JF Hoyt IP 1988 Hypnosis and the psychology of delusions Oltmanns TF Maher BA Delusional Beliefs New York John Wiley and Sons
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Authors
Fineberg, S. K., & Corlett, P. R.
Affiliations
Yale University (US)
Corresponding author
Corlett, P. R.
Venue
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
Published
2016-01-02
Volume
21
Issue
1
Pages
73-89
ISSN
  • 1354-6805 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-0619
OpenAlex
W2322550575
Cited by
48
References
161
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4
FWCI
31.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
  • International Mental Health Research Organization (Rising Star Translational Research Award)
  • National Center for Research Resources (NCRR and NCATS CTSA grant number UL1 TR000142)
  • National Institute of Mental Health (5T32MH019961)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
delusions, predictive coding, prediction error, top-down expectations, delusion maintenance, delusion formation, prior distributions, belief updating
MeSH terms
Association Learning, Brain, Capgras Syndrome, Delusions, Humans, Learning, Memory, Motivation, Psychological Theory, Mental Recall, Knowledge

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