Neurofunctional correlates of body-ownership and sense of agency: A meta-analytical account of self-consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Self-consciousness consists of several dissociable experiences, including the sense of ownership of one's body and the sense of agency over one's action consequences. The relationship between body-ownership and the sense of agency has been described by different neurocognitive models, each providing specific neurofunctional predictions. According to an "additive" model, the sense of agency entails body-ownership, while an alternative "independence" hypothesis suggests that they represent two qualitatively different processes, underpinned by distinct brain systems. We propose a third "interactive" model, arguing the interdependence between body-ownership and the sense of agency: these constructs might represent different experiences with specific and exclusive brain correlates, but they also could partly overlap at the neurofunctional level. Here we test these three neurocognitive models by reviewing the available neurofunctional literature of body-ownership and the sense of agency, with a quantitative meta-analytical approach that allowed us to compare their neural correlates statistically. We identified (i) a body-ownership-specific network including the left inferior parietal lobule and the left extra-striate body area, (ii) a sense-of-agency-specific network including the left SMA, the left posterior insula, the right postcentral gyrus, and the right superior temporal lobe and (iii) a shared network in the left middle insula. These results provide support for the interactive neurocognitive model of body-ownership and the sense of agency. Body-ownership involves a sensory network in which multisensory inputs are integrated to be self-attributed. On the other hand, the sense of agency is specifically associated with premotor and sensory-motor areas, typically involved in generating motor predictions and in action monitoring. Finally, body-ownership and the sense of agency interact at the level of the left middle insula, a high-level multisensory hub engaged in body and action awareness in general.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
The Peripersonal Space in a social world
Bogdanova, O. V., Bogdanov, V. B., Dureux, A., Farnè, A., & Hadj-Bouziane, F. (2021) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2021.05.005 · Cited by 86
“This structure regulates functions of the autonomic system and participates in forming bodily self-awareness, sense of agency and body ownership (Seghezzi et al., 2019; Uddin et al., 2017).”
BackgroundCausal Inference of Body Ownership in the Posterior Parietal Cortex
Chancel, M., Iriye, H., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2022) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.0656-22.2022 · Cited by 55
“…2019; Rohe et al., 2019) where parietal regions implement multisensory estimates of body ownership, regardless of the context (Ganguli et al., 2008; Suzuki and Gottlieb, 2013), and frontal regions integrate contextual cues, and prior expectations, taking into account sensory uncertainty (Gau and…”
BackgroundVaisvaser, S. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2025.1726099 · Cited by 4
“The insula hub was shown to be engaged in both body perception and action awareness, forming a sense of body ownership and of self-agency (56, 90).”
A systematic review and meta-analysis on the neural correlates of bodily self-consciousness
Brunello, N., Diana, L., Sritharan, J., Glisic, M., Nef, T., Verma, R. K., & Zito, G. A. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106420 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Seghezzi, S., Giannini, G., & Zapparoli, L.
- Venue
- Cortex
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019-12
- Volume
- 121
- Pages
- 169-178
- ISSN
- 0010-9452 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2973923300
- Cited by
- 99
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 5.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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