SCADAWall: A CPI-enabled firewall model for SCADA security
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Many firewalls have been extending their security capabilities to support Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems or to protect the operations within industrial process control. A SCADA firewall usually needs to inspect deeper into the payload to understand exactly what detailed industrial applications are being executed. However, security features in traditional SCADA firewalls have drawbacks in two main aspects. First, a traditional Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) enabled SCADA firewall only partially inspects the content of payload. Specially-crafted packets carrying malicious payload can exploit this drawback to bypass the firewall’s inspection. Second, existing SCADA firewalls have poor capability for protecting proprietary industrial protocols. In this paper, we propose a new SCADA firewall model called SCADAWall. This model is powered by our Comprehensive Packet Inspection (CPI) technology. SCADAWall also includes a new Proprietary Industrial Protocols Extension Algorithm (PIPEA) to extend capabilities to proprietary industrial protocol protection, and an Out-of-Sequence Detection Algorithm (OSDA) to detect abnormality within industrial operations. We have compared our security features with two commercial SCADA firewalls. Our experiment also shows that SCADAWall can effectively mitigate those drawbacks without sacrificing SCADA system’s low latency requirement.
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Cites
Accurate modeling of modbus/TCP for intrusion detection in SCADA systems
Goldenberg, N., & Wool, A. (2013) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.05.001 · Cited by 323
Design and Implementation of a Secure Modbus Protocol
Fovino, I. N., Carcano, A., Masera, M., & Trombetta, A. (2009) · IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04798-5_6 · Cited by 138
Critical State-Based Filtering System for Securing SCADA Network Protocols
Nai Fovino, I., Coletta, A., Carcano, A., & Masera, M. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics · doi:10.1109/tie.2011.2181132 · Cited by 108
Shahzad, A., Lee, M., Lee, Y.-K., Kim, S., Xiong, N., Choi, J.-Y., & Cho, Y. (2015) · Symmetry · doi:10.3390/sym7031176 · Cited by 86
Cited by
Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review
Yadav, G., & Paul, K. (2021) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2021.100433 · Cited by 261
Upadhyay, D., & Sampalli, S. (2020) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.101666 · Cited by 242
Securing SCADA-based Critical Infrastructures: Challenges and Open Issues
Tariq, N., Asim, M., & Khan, F. A. (2019) · Procedia Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.procs.2019.08.086 · Cited by 56
Securing SCADA and critical industrial systems: From needs to security mechanisms
Abou el Kalam, A. (2021) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2020.100394 · Cited by 38
Upadhyay, D., Ghosh, S., Ohno, H., Zaman, M., & Sampalli, S. (2024) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2024.100705 · Cited by 18
Kim, H., Kim, S., Jo, W., Kim, K.-H., & Shon, T. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3080081 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Li, D., Guo, H., Zhou, J., Zhou, L., & Wong, J. W.
- Venue
- Computers & Security
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019-01
- Volume
- 80
- Pages
- 134-154
- ISSN
- 0167-4048 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2896019171
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 4.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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