Negative Emotional Outcomes Attenuate Sense of Agency over Voluntary Actions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling that one's voluntary actions produce external sensory events [1, 2]. Several psychological theories hypothesized links between SoA and affective evaluation [3-6]. For example, people tend to attribute positive outcomes to their own actions, perhaps reflecting high-level narrative processes that enhance self-esteem [3]. Here we provide the first evidence that such emotional modulations also involve changes in the low-level sensorimotor basis of agency. The intentional binding paradigm [1] was used to quantify the subjective temporal compression between a voluntary action and its sensory consequences, providing an implicit measure of SoA. Emotional valence of action outcomes was manipulated by following participants' key-press actions with negative or positive emotional vocalizations [7], or neutral sounds. We found that intentional binding was reduced for negative compared to positive or neutral outcomes. Discriminant analyses identified a change in time perception of both actions and their negative outcomes, demonstrating that the experience of action itself is subject to affective modulation. A small binding benefit was also found for positive action outcomes. Emotional modulation of SoA may contribute to regulating social behavior. Correctly tracking the valenced effects of one's voluntary actions on other people could underlie successful social interactions.
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Yoshie, M., & Haggard, P.
- Venue
- Current Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-10
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 20
- Pages
- 2028-2032
- ISSN
- 0960-9822 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1963960402
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 3.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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