Cited by 126Free Will and AgencyNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesMotor Control and Adaptation

The Neurocognitive Bases of Human Volition.

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Haggard, Patrick·2019·Annual Review of Psychology

Abstract

Volition refers to a capacity for endogenous action, particularly goal-directed endogenous action, shared by humans and some other animals. It has long been controversial whether a specific set of cognitive processes for volition exist in the human brain, and much scientific thinking on the topic continues to revolve around traditional metaphysical debates about free will. At its origins, scientific psychology had a strong engagement with volition. This was followed by a period of disenchantment, or even outright hostility, during the second half of the twentieth century. In this review, I aim to reinvigorate the scientific approach to volition by, first, proposing a range of different features that constitute a new, neurocognitively realistic working definition of volition. I then focus on three core features of human volition: its generativity (the capacity to trigger actions), its subjectivity (the conscious experiences associated with initiating voluntary actions), and its teleology (the goal-directed quality of some voluntary actions). I conclude that volition is a neurocognitive process of enormous societal importance and susceptible to scientific investigation.

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  • The idea that the skull marks a meaningful divide behind which a sacrosanct conscious agent orchestrates behaviour is extremely difficult to maintain in the face of philosophical, theoretical, and empirical objections.

    “In the case of free will, the idea that the skull marks a meaningful divide behind which some sacrosanct conscious agent orchestrates behaviour is extremely difficult to maintain in the face of philosophical, theoretical, and empirical objections [64,76–78].”

    From Ethical considerations for the use of brain–computer interfaces for cognitive enhancement (2024) · cites this paper as [78]

    Section 6 says evidence from the Libet experiment rules out a Cartesian view in which conscious intention triggers the brain activity leading to movement; Section 2.5 likewise describes conscious volition as a consequence rather than a cause of neural activity. The paper does not address the claimed skull boundary or establish that philosophical, theoretical, and empirical objections collectively make the broader idea untenable. Its conclusion explicitly leaves open whether people have conscious free will. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  8. RevengeMultilevel Review and Synthesis Joshua Conrad Jackson, Virginia K. Choi, and Michele J. Gelfand p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 319 The Caring Continuum: Evolved Hormonal and Proximal Mechanisms Explain Prosocial and Antisocial Extremes Abigail A. Marsh p p p p p p p

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Authors
Haggard, P.
Affiliations
University of London (GB)
Corresponding author
Haggard, Patrick
Venue
Annual Review of Psychology
Published
2019-01-04
Volume
70
Issue
1
Pages
9-28
ISSN
  • 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-2085
OpenAlex
W2888599222
Cited by
126
References
85
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 2
FWCI
1.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Leverhulme Trust (RPG‐2016‐378)
  • Conseil Régional, Île-de-France
  • FP7 Ideas: European Research Council (323943)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
Keywords
volition, free will, goal-directed action, voluntary action, subjective experience, generativity, teleology, history of psychology
MeSH terms
Brain, Goals, Humans, Neuropsychology, Volition

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