The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness
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Citations
Cites
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260580 · Cited by 7,905
Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005) · Identification and Inference for Econometric Models · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614491.006 · Cited by 7,211
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x · Cited by 3,610
Social Value of Public Information
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024610 · Cited by 1,967
Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence
Alesina, A., & Summers, L. H. (1993) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2077833 · Cited by 1,833
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., & Pagano, M. (1991) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344630 · Cited by 1,585
Optimal contracts for central bankers
Walsh, C. E. (1995) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,485
Central Banking in Theory and PracticePreprint
Blinder, A. S. (1998) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,447
(1992) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,366
Cited by
Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures
Dincer, N., & Eichengreen, B. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2579544 · Cited by 460
Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set
Garriga, A. C. (2016) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813 · Cited by 411
Disagreement Among Forecasters in G7 Countries
Dovern, J., Fritsche, U., & Slacalek, J. (2012) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00207 · Cited by 394
Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions
Bodea, C., & Hicks, R. (2015) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818314000277 · Cited by 316
The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World
Crowe, C., & Meade, E. E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.4.69 · Cited by 302
Self-citationWhat determines debt intolerance? The role of political and monetary institutions
Giordano, R., & Tommasino, P. (2011) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.02.001 · Cited by 285
The Politics of Central Bank Independence
<!>de Haan, J., & Eijffinger, S. C. W. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2887931 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Crowe, C., & Meade, E. E.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-12
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 763-777
- ISSN
- 0176-2680 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121368961
- Cited by
- 311
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 33.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.