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Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness
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Self-citation
Cited by
Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures
Dincer, N., & Eichengreen, B. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2579544 · Cited by 460
Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set
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Disagreement Among Forecasters in G7 Countries
Dovern, J., Fritsche, U., & Slacalek, J. (2012) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00207 · Cited by 394
Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions
Bodea, C., & Hicks, R. (2015) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818314000277 · Cited by 316
The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World
Crowe, C., & Meade, E. E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.4.69 · Cited by 302
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Crowe, C., & Meade, E. E.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-12
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 763-777
- ISSN
- 0176-2680 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121368961
- Cited by
- 311
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 33.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.