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Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future
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The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
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Does central bank independence really matter?
Haan, J. D., & Kooi, W. J. (2000) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(99)00084-9 · Cited by 176
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Cited by
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A META-REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Klomp, J., & De Haan, J. (2010) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00597.x · Cited by 209
The Politics of Central Bank Independence
<!>de Haan, J., & Eijffinger, S. C. W. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2887931 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Cukierman, A.
- Venue
- European Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-12
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 722-736
- ISSN
- 0176-2680 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1997563477
- Cited by
- 401
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 50.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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