Earnouts: A study of financial contracting in acquisition agreements
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cain, M. D., Denis, D. J., & Denis, D. K.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-02
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 151-170
- ISSN
- 0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2080753337
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 25.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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