The DOI matches its Crossref record; 55 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance
Open accessAbstract
ABSTRACT: This study investigates whether the agency conflicts inherent in a dual class ownership structure are associated with the level of firms' tax avoidance. Dual class ownership presents a unique agency problem because insiders control a majority of the votes of a firm despite having claims to a minority of the firm's cash flows. We examine the level of tax avoidance for a sample of dual class firms and find that the extent of tax avoidance declines as the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights increases. We also compare the level of tax avoidance of dual class firms to a sample of propensity matched single class firms and find that dual class firms engage in less tax avoidance as the wedge between insiders' voting rights and cash flow rights increases. These findings are consistent with dual class ownership entrenching managers and allowing them to perform at a suboptimal level. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.
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A Survey of Corporate Governance
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Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
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How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005 · Cited by 4,185
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
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Cited by
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior
DYRENG, S. D., HOOPES, J. L., & WILDE, J. H. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12101 · Cited by 533
Metadata
- Authors
- McGuire, S. T., Wang, D., & Wilson, R. J.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1487-1516
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-5068
- OpenAlex
- W3123258275
- Cited by
- 341
- References
- 55
- FWCI
- 20.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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