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Cited by 228

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Political control and performance in China's listed firms

Chang, Eric C., Wong, Sonia M.L. · 2004 · Journal of Comparative Economics

Overview

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.jce.2004.08.001

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Citations

Cites

  • A Survey of Corporate Governance

    Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 1×

    “However, recent studies on corporate g ernance suggest that controlling shareholders themselves may not maximize profits their control rights allow them to expropriate minority shareholders and outside c tors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000).”
    Background
  • Investor protection and corporate governance

    La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848 · cited 2×

    “However, recent studies on corporate g ernance suggest that controlling shareholders themselves may not maximize profits their control rights allow them to expropriate minority shareholders and outside c tors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000).”
    Background

Cited by

See all 228

Metadata

Authors
Chang, E. C., & Wong, S. M. L.
Venue
Journal of Comparative Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2004-12
Volume
32
Issue
4
Pages
617-636
ISSN
0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2010698852
Cited by
228
References
2
FWCI
12.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.