The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards
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Citations
Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,326
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 7,585
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,659
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings
Dittmar, A. K., & Mahrt‐Smith, J. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.12.006 · Cited by 2,135
Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors
Gillan, S., & Starks, L. T. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00058-1 · Cited by 1,707
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
CREMERS, K. J. M., & NAIR, V. B. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00819.x · Cited by 1,220
The costs of entrenched boards
Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.006 · Cited by 986
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Lipton, 1979, Takeover bids in the target's boardroom, The Business Lawyer, 35, 101
- Murti, 2005, More boards may end staggered terms, Wall Street Journal (June 8, 2005), p. 1
- Wilcox, 2002, Two cheers for staggered boards, Corporate Governance Advisor, 10, 1
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 101–113 of 113
(2021) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-819782-0.16001-0
(2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-801390-8.00029-6
(2010) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-374878-2.00074-x
(2011) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-374949-9.00016-6
(2019) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-815075-7.09992-7
The Corporate Governance Performance Puzzle: New InsightsPreprint
Dumitrescu, A., & Zakriya, M. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2989446
(2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-385487-2.00027-1
(2011) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-385485-8.00023-2
Vithayathil, J., & Sierra, G. E. (2022) · Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1002/jcaf.22555
Do Classified Boards Affect Corporate Environmental and Social Performance?Preprint
Haß, L. H., Loukopoulos, G., & Nazimuddin, N. N. B. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4917426
(2025) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-16106-3.16001-6
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework & SurveyPreprint
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1299212
Staggered boards and corporate green innovationPreprint
Ye, S. (2026) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-10439907/v1
Metadata
- Authors
- Guo, R.-J., Kruse, T. A., & Nohel, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Illinois Chicago (US)
- Xavier University (US)
- Loyola University Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nohel, Tom
- Venue
- Journal of Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2008-06
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 274-288
- ISSN
- 0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122503504
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 27.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Corporate Finance (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- Keywords
- staggered boards, takeover defenses, shareholder activism, corporate governance, shareholder wealth effects, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, takeover targets, investor reaction
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