Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards

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Shark repellents and stock prices

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The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy

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An empirical investigation of the impact of ‘antitakeover’ amendments on common stock prices

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The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy

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Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs

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Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

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Governance indexes and valuation: Which causes which?

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Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers

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Voting power in the proxy process

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Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists 'Just Vote No'?Preprint

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A Generalized Econometric Model and Tests of a Signalling Hypothesis with Two Discrete Signals

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Board Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments

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Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IposPreprint

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Managerial Share Ownership and the Stock Price Effects of Antitakeover Amendment Proposals

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Value of Latent Information: Alternative Event Study Methods

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The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants

Bebchuk, L. A., Coates, J. C., & Subramanian, G. (2002) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1229675 · Cited by 68

Is (Institutional) Shareholder Activism New? Evidence from UK Shareholder Coalitions in the Pre‐Cadbury Era

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The differential impact on stockholder wealth of various antitakeover provisions

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A Generalized Econometric Model and Tests of a Signalling Hypothesis with Two Discrete Signals

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Governance Indices and Valuation Multiples: Which Causes Which?Preprint

Lehn, K. M., Patro, S., & Zhao, M. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 31

Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?

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Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections

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Classification Cancels Corporate Accountability

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Shark repellents and stock prices : The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980

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Shareholder Proposals to Rescind Poison Pills: All Bark and No Bite?Preprint

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Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?Preprint

Ganor, M. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.908668 · Cited by 13

Institutional Shareholders' Split Personality on Corporate Governance: Active in Proxies, Passive in IposPreprint

Klausner, M. D. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.292083 · Cited by 6

Policy Proposals for Solving Funding Problems with Shareholder Litigation in China

Chen, W. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-10-3623-1_7 · Cited by 2

What Matters in Corporate Governance?

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The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey

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Passive investors, not passive owners

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Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle

Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K. A., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2015.1024503 · Cited by 564

Shareholder Activism

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Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?Preprint

Ganor, M. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.908668 · Cited by 13

The Trouble with Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson's John WilcoxPreprint

Bebchuk, L. A., Coates, J., & Subramanian, G. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.384980 · Cited by 5

Activism and the Move Away from Staggered BoardsPreprint

Nohel, T. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1884710 · Cited by 3

Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural ExperimentsPreprint

Bebchuk, L. A., Wang, C. C. Y., & Cohen, A. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1876678

Declassifying the ClassifiedPreprint

Weill, R. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.586081 · Cited by 2