Cited by 113Corporate Finance and GovernanceCorporate Governance and LawFinancial Markets and Investment Strategies

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Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards

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Guo, Re-Jin, Kruse, Timothy A., Nohel, Tom·2008·Journal of Corporate Finance

DOI 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.007

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Authors: Guo, R.-J., Kruse, T. A., & Nohel, T.
Affiliations: University of Illinois Chicago (US)
Xavier University (US)
Loyola University Chicago (US)
Corresponding author: Nohel, Tom
ORCID: Kruse, Timothy A.
Nohel, Tom
Venue: Journal of Corporate Finance
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Published: 2008-06
Volume: 14
Issue: 3
Pages: 274-288
ISSN: 0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.007
OpenAlex: W3122503504
Cited by: 113
References: 54
Citations by year: 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 9
FWCI: 27.19
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: green
doi.org
Licence: www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations: Journal of Corporate Finance (publishedVersion)
SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
Keywords: staggered boards, takeover defenses, shareholder activism, corporate governance, shareholder wealth effects, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, takeover targets, investor reaction

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Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards

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