Do employee-friendly firms invest more efficiently? Evidence from labor investment efficiency
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We investigate the impact of employee treatment on labor investment efficiency. We provide evidence that employee-friendly treatment is significantly associated with lower deviations of labor investment from the level justified by economic fundamentals, i.e., higher labor investment efficiency. The effect of employee treatment on labor investment efficiency is stronger for firms that are human-capital-intensive, with more skilled labor and knowledge capital, and those that face higher product market competition. Using the 2008–2009 financial crisis as an external shock and applying the difference-in-difference method, we also show that employee-friendly firms have higher labor investment efficiency in the post-financial crisis period, but experience more inefficient labor investments during the crisis. Our results are robust to placebo tests, selection bias, propensity score matching, alternative explanations, alternative proxies for both employee treatment and labor investment efficiency as well as the adjustment for using residuals as dependent variables, additional control variables, and various approaches in addressing endogeneity issues.
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Cited by
Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5 · Cited by 1,923
Huang, S. (2022) · Economic Analysis and Policy · doi:10.1016/j.eap.2022.03.014 · Cited by 120
Economic Analysis of Widespread Adoption of CSR and Sustainability Reporting Standards
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cao, Z., & Rees, W.
- Venue
- Journal of Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-12
- Volume
- 65
- Pages
- 101744
- ISSN
- 0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3088928475
- Cited by
- 241
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 41.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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