The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence
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Citations
Cites
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297968 · Cited by 33,272
(2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27,577
Interaction terms in logit and probit models
Ai, C., & Norton, E. C. (2003) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00032-6 · Cited by 4,599
Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data
Anderson, T. W., & Hsiao, C. (1982) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(82)90095-1 · Cited by 2,849
Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for macroeconomists
Judson, R. A., & Owen, A. L. (1999) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00130-5 · Cited by 2,171
Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles
Rogoff, K. (1987) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2428 · Cited by 1,877
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. W. (1987) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116710 · Cited by 1,611
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297526 · Cited by 1,607
The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1996) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2960152 · Cited by 1,506
Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?
Shi, M., & Svensson, J. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009 · Cited by 969
Cited by
Aidt, T. S., Veiga, F. J., & Veiga, L. G. (2011) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9644-3 · Cited by 279
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus
Dubois, E. (2016) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0313-z · Cited by 273
Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility
Camacho, A., & Conover, E. (2011) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.3.2.41 · Cited by 144
Voter Preferences, Electoral Promises, and the Composition of Public Spending
Keefer, P., Scartascini, C., & Vlaicu, R. (2020) · doi:10.18235/0002434 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Drazen, A., & Eslava, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Development Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-05
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 39-52
- ISSN
- 0304-3878 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2055392070
- Cited by
- 684
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 48.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Drazen, A., & Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.