The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Persuading voters to punish corrupt vote-buying candidates: Experimental evidence from a large-scale radio campaign in India
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“In India, radio campaigns with stories discouraging people from supporting corrupt politicians led people to be less likely to vote for “vote buying” parties (Schechter & Vasudevan, 2023).”
From Stories in Action. (2022) · cites this paper as Schechter & Vasudevan, 2023
Citations
Cites
Gentzkow, M. (2006) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.121.3.931 · Cited by 842 · cited 2×
“…newspaper (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson, 2011; Snyder and Str¨omberg, 2010), television (DellaVigna and Ka-plan, 2007; Gentzkow, 2006), and radio (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; 1 According to the sixth wave (2010-2014) of the World Values Survey,…”
BackgroundThe Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral Politics
Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M., & Sinkinson, M. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.7.2980 · Cited by 497 · cited 1×
“…(DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; Str¨omberg, 2016), as well as the the electoral effects of mass media, such as newspaper (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Gentzkow, Shapiro and Sinkinson, 2011; Snyder and Str¨omberg, 2010), television (DellaVigna and Ka-plan, 2007; Gentzkow, 2006), and radio (DellaVigna…”
Background
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Walsh, J., Vaida, N., Coman, A., & Fiske, S. T. (2022) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/15291006231161337 · Cited by 26
“In India, radio campaigns with stories discouraging people from supporting corrupt politicians led people to be less likely to vote for “vote buying” parties (Schechter & Vasudevan, 2023).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Schechter, L., & Vasudevan, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Schechter, Laura
- Venue
- Journal of Development Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2023-01
- Volume
- 160
- Pages
- 102976
- ISSN
- 0304-3878 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4296818348
- Cited by
- 12
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2
- FWCI
- 4.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Development Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Keywords
- vote buying, electoral corruption, radio campaign, voting behavior, campaign effectiveness, 2014 Indian general election, election issues, media interviews
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Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Persuading voters to punish corrupt vote-buying candidates: Experimental evidence from a large-scale radio campaign in India. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102976
- The paper
- Schechter, L., & Vasudevan, S. (2023). Persuading voters to punish corrupt vote-buying candidates: Experimental evidence from a large-scale radio campaign in India. Journal of Development Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102976