The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The aversion to lying
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Cites
An Introduction to the Bootstrap
Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. J. (1994) · doi:10.1201/9780429246593 · Cited by 40,500
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Festinger, L. (1957) · doi:10.1515/9781503620766 · Cited by 24,241 · cited 1×
“2 The idea that communication can create commitment is related to the broader literature in psychologythat emphasizes people’s desire for consistency; see, for example, Heider (1946), Newcomb (1953), Festinger (1957) and Cialdini (1993).”
BackgroundA Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
(2017) · Macat Library eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781912282432 · Cited by 18,122
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555475 · Cited by 7,484
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction
Camerer, C. F. (2003) · Cited by 3,722
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
Cited by
Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449 · Cited by 698
Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies
Gächter, S., & Schulz, J. F. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature17160 · Cited by 551
Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior
Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M. J. J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2011) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.02.001 · Cited by 515
Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie
Gneezy, U., Kajackaite, A., & Sobel, J. (2018) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20161553 · Cited by 481
Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications)
Shalvi, S., Eldar, O., & Bereby-Meyer, Y. (2012) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797612443835 · Cited by 439
Self-Serving Justifications: Doing Wrong and Feeling Moral
Shalvi, S., Gino, F., Barkan, R., & Ayal, S. (2015) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721414553264 · Cited by 422
“Moving beyond this external cost-benefit analysis, a growing body of evidence shows people exhibit some level of aversion to behaving unethically, even when their unethical behavior will never be revealed (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gino et al., 2009; Gneezy, 2005; Hilbig & Hessler, 2013; Lewis et al., 2012; Lu…”
BackgroundLet’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling
Rosenbaum, S. M., Billinger, S., & Stieglitz, N. (2014) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.10.002 · Cited by 288
Kajackaite, A., & Gneezy, U. (2017) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.015 · Cited by 278
MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY
de Haan, T., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2015) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/iere.12141 · Cited by 15
Metadata
- Authors
- Lundquist, T., Ellingsen, T., Gribbe, E., & Johannesson, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-05
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 81-92
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2051710855
- Cited by
- 312
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 38.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.