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The aversion to lying
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lundquist, T., Ellingsen, T., Gribbe, E., & Johannesson, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-05
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 81-92
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2051710855
- Cited by
- 312
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 38.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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