The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the highest fraction of lies is from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the maximal lie. More participants lie partially when the experimenter cannot observe their outcomes than when the experimenter can verify the observed outcome. Partial lying increases when the prior probability of the highest outcome decreases. (JEL C91, D12, D90, Z13)
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Cites
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
Fischbacher, U. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 · Cited by 9,510
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554881 · Cited by 5,585
The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633 · Cited by 2,875
Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE
Greiner, B. (2015) · Journal of the Economic Science Association · doi:10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4 · Cited by 2,276
Deception: The Role of Consequences
Gneezy, U. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828053828662 · Cited by 1,729
Self-citationCharness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x · Cited by 1,491
LIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
Fischbacher, U., & Föllmi-Heusi, F. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12014 · Cited by 1,243
Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets *
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr002 · Cited by 1,042
Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449 · Cited by 698
Self-citationBusiness culture and dishonesty in the banking industry
Cohn, A., Fehr, E., & Maréchal, M. A. (2014) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature13977 · Cited by 687
Cited by
Civic honesty around the globe
Cohn, A., Maréchal, M. A., Tannenbaum, D., & Zünd, C. L. (2019) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aau8712 · Cited by 322
Cohn, A., Gesche, T., & Maréchal, M. A. (2022) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.3985 · Cited by 62
Effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion
Buckenmaier, J., Dimant, E., & Mittone, L. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.004 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Gneezy, U., Kajackaite, A., & Sobel, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2018-02-01
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 419-453
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2568738663
- Cited by
- 481
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 90.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.