The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262109 · Cited by 3,186
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach
SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04661.x · Cited by 2,893
Corporate finance and corporate governance
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04592.x · Cited by 2,266
Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking
Diamond, D. W., & Rajan, R. G. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/319552 · Cited by 2,002
Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market
Bagehot, W. (1873) · History of Economic Thought Books · Cited by 1,971
Private and Public Supply of Liquidity
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250001 · Cited by 1,822
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118350 · Cited by 1,438
Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2002) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00171-x · Cited by 1,371
The effects of government ownership on bank lending
Sapienza, P. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2002.10.002 · Cited by 1,363
Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?
Carlson, C., Burtraw, D., Cropper, M., & Palmer, K. L. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/317681 · Cited by 1,186
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1991) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3906 · Cited by 1,060
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00052 · Cited by 1,010
Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises
DIAMOND, D. W., & RAJAN, R. G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00741.x · Cited by 874
Cifuentes, R., Ferrucci, G., & Shin, H. S. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.556 · Cited by 862
Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence
Rajan, R. G. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118468 · Cited by 806
Wilson, R. (1979) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884475 · Cited by 712
Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries
Acharya, V. V., Bharath, S. T., & Srinivasan, A. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.011 · Cited by 700
Self-citationDo Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Transactions
Pulvino, T. C. (1998) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00040 · Cited by 680
Investor valuation of the abandonment option
Berger, P. G., Ofek, E., & Swary, I. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(96)00877-x · Cited by 641
Limited market participation and volatility of asset prices
Gale, D. M., Allen, F., & London School of Economics (United Kingdom). Financial Markets Group (1993) · OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) · Cited by 598
Caprio, G., Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2007) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2006.10.003 · Cited by 584
Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance
Williamson, O. E. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328184 · Cited by 539
Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being “Too Big to Fail”
O'HARA, M., & SHAW, W. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03729.x · Cited by 526
Bank insolvencies: cross-country experiencePreprint
Honohan, P., & Klingebiel, D. (1996) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 483
The Losses Realized in Bank Failures
JAMES, C. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04616.x · Cited by 413
Self-interested bank regulation
Thakor, A. V., & Boot, A. W. A. (1993) · American Economic Review · Cited by 362
Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States
Gorton, G. (1985) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700033957 · Cited by 343
The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
Brown, C. O., & Dinc, I. S. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097506 · Cited by 335
Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence
Hoggarth, G., Reis, R., & Saporta, V. (2002) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00268-0 · Cited by 333
The macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy requirements for banks
Blum, J., & Hellwig, M. (1995) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)00081-a · Cited by 319
The S & L insurance mess: how did it happen?
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-3394 · Cited by 314
A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation
Acharya, V. V. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.236401 · Cited by 307
Self-citationDon't Put All Your Eggs in One Basket? Diversification and Specialization in Lending
Winton, A. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.173615 · Cited by 287
The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial Architecture in Transition
Berglof, E., & Bolton, P. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027120 · Cited by 252
The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial Architecture in Transition
Berglof, E., & Bolton, P. (2004) · Financial Development and Economic Growth · doi:10.1057/9780230374270_4 · Cited by 251
Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect
Cordella, T., & Yeyati, E. L. (2003) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/s1042-9573(03)00046-9 · Cited by 235
Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests
Strömberg, P. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00302 · Cited by 216
Self-Interested Bank Regulation.
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 177
Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?
Perotti, E. C., & Suarez, J. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(02)00241-6 · Cited by 172
Optimal Bail Out Policy, Conditionality and Constructive AmbiguityPreprint
Freixas, X. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.199054 · Cited by 152
Do Loan Commitments Cause Overlending?
Thakor, A. V. (2005) · Journal of money credit and banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2006.0009 · Cited by 148
Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04070.x · Cited by 137
Caprio, G., Laeven, L. A., Levine, R. E., & Bank, W. (2004) · World Bank policy research working paper · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3202 · Cited by 87
Some Evidence on "Herding" Behavior of U. S. Banks
Jain, A. K., & Gupta, S. (1987) · Journal of money credit and banking · doi:10.2307/1992247 · Cited by 78
Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard vs. Value EffectPreprint
Cordella, T., & Levy-Yeyati, E. L. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.188153 · Cited by 58
A Model of the Lender of Last Resort
Huang, H., & Goodhart, C. A. E. (1999) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.5089/9781451845815.001 · Cited by 58
What Do State-Owned Firms Maximize? Evidence from Italian BanksPreprint
Sapienza, P. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.303381 · Cited by 37
Cited by
Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L. H., Philippon, T., & Richardson, M. (2017) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhw088 · Cited by 1,826
Self-citationCollective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts
Farhi, E., & Tirole, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.60 · Cited by 1,117
Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity
Beck, T., De Jonghe, O., & Schepens, G. (2013) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2012.07.001 · Cited by 1,021
A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation
Acharya, V. V. (2009) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2009.02.001 · Cited by 664
Self-citationEstimating global bank network connectedness
Demirer, M., Diebold, F. X., Liu, L., & Yilmaz, K. (2018) · Journal of Applied Econometrics · doi:10.1002/jae.2585 · Cited by 607
Metadata
- Authors
- Acharya, V. V., & Yorulmazer, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-31
- ISSN
- 1042-9573 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3126083444
- Cited by
- 729
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 21.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.