The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment
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A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 7,585
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,659
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,275
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 · Cited by 3,045
A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q
Chung, K. H., & Pruitt, S. W. (1994) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665623 · Cited by 2,460
Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90002-h · Cited by 1,937
Stock prices and top management changes
Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., & Wruck, K. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90054-2 · Cited by 1,649
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Items 201–300 of 573
Corporate Lobbying and CEO PayPreprint
Skaife, H. A., Veenman, D., & Werner, T. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2340501 · Cited by 20
Mohapatra, S., Kumar, A., Mohapatra, M. R., & Srivastava, V. (2024) · Finance research letters · doi:10.1016/j.frl.2024.106616 · Cited by 19
Gwala, R. S., & Mashau, P. (2022) · Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review · doi:10.22495/cgobrv6i1p7 · Cited by 25
“Similarly, Faleye (2007) found that CEO duality is positively correlated to organisational complexity, the CEO reputation, and the level of managerial ownership.”
BackgroundZheng, X., Deng, J., Song, X., Ye, M., & Luo, L. (2022) · Engineering Construction & Architectural Management · doi:10.1108/ecam-03-2022-0286 · Cited by 19
The Purposive Transformation of Corporate Law
Kershaw, D., & Schuster, E. (2020) · The American journal of comparative law · doi:10.1093/ajcl/avac004 · Cited by 11
An Ohlson valuation framework for valuing corporate governance: The case of Taiwan
Lee, S., Lin, C., & Chang, P.-T. (2011) · Pacific-Basin Finance Journal · doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2011.03.003 · Cited by 19
Is What's Best for Employees Best for Shareholders?Preprint
Faleye, O., & Trahan, E. A. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.888180 · Cited by 19
“Faleye et al. (2006) examine significant labor-controlled equity blocks and find that these are associated with large deviations from value maximization.”
Self-citationCEO Turnover in China: The Role of Market-Based and Accounting Performance MeasuresPreprint
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1084396 · Cited by 19
“4 Japan (Conyon and Florou, 2002; Fee and Hadlock, 2004; Denis and Kruse, 2000; Faleye, 2007; Huson, et al., 2004; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Weisbach, 1988, 1995)”
Directors: Older and Wiser, or Too Old to Govern?Preprint
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., Xie, F., & Zhang, S. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3284874 · Cited by 19
Thirty Years of Change: The Evolution of Classified Boards
Guernsey, S., Guo, F., Liu, T., & Serfling, M. (2025) · Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.13485 · Cited by 13
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K. M., & Nielsen, T. V. (2011) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.03.007 · Cited by 18
Composition of the board and firm value of brazilian public companies
Gondrige, E. D. O., Clemente, A., & Espejo, M. M. D. S. B. (2012) · Brazilian Business Review · doi:10.15728/bbr.2012.9.3.4 · Cited by 18
“This finding, despite being low correlation, differs from one part of the literature (Bhagat and Black, 1999, 2001; YERMACK, 1996; EISENBERG, SUNDGREN and WELLS, 1998; SILVEIRA, BARROS and FAMA, 2003), which states no relationship between board size and value of companies or have a negative relationship. However, this…”
ResultInfluentialDeferred Compensation, Risk, and Company Value: Investor Reactions to CEO Incentives
Wei, C., & Yermack, D. (2010) · Econstor (Econstor) · Cited by 18
Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?
González, T. A., Schmid, M., & Yermack, D. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3130 · Cited by 17
“Like prior research on the topic (Faleye, 2007), we find no evidence of decreased director turnover on classified boards. columns of Table 8 show two patterns for cartel firms.”
Managerial entrenchment and payout policy: A catering effect
Gyimah, D., & Gyapong, E. (2021) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101600 · Cited by 18
Dividends, Values and Agency Costs in REITs
Chou, W.-H., Hardin, W. G., Hill, M. D., & Kelly, G. W. (2011) · The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics · doi:10.1007/s11146-011-9314-3 · Cited by 17
“Board independence is also quantified based on the percentage of directors who are insiders and affiliates, where a larger percentage implies weaker governance as proposed by Faleye (2007) .”
Antitakeover provisions and CEO monetary benefits: Revisiting the E-index
Dah, B. A., Michael, A., & Dixon, R. (2017) · Research in International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.033 · Cited by 17
“Table 6 indicates that, consistent with the previous literature, both MB and TP provisions have a negative effect on firm value (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007).”
BackgroundInternal and External Discipline Following Securities Class ActionsPreprint
Humphery‐Jenner, M. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1809683 · Cited by 17
The Determinants of CEO Inside Debt and its ComponentsPreprint
Cen, W. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1716306 · Cited by 17
Why Do Firms Engage in Selective Hedging?Preprint
Adam, T., Fernando, C. S., & Salas, J. M. (2012) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.18452/4393 · Cited by 16
The Relation between Corporate Governance and Credit Risk, Bond Yields and Firm ValuationPreprint
Bradley, M., Chen, D., Dallas, G. S., & Snyderwine, E. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1078463 · Cited by 16
Antitakeover Legislation and Accounting Conservatism: New Evidence
Cheng, S.-J., Duru, A. I., & Zhao, Y. (2017) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2017.02.003 · Cited by 15
Entrenchment vs long-term benefits: classified boards and CSR
Cullinan, C. P., Mahoney, L. S., & Roush, P. B. (2019) · Journal of Global Responsibility · doi:10.1108/jgr-11-2018-0063 · Cited by 15
Director and officer liability protection and firm value: Unintended consequences
Aguir, I., & Aguir, W. (2019) · Finance research letters · doi:10.1016/j.frl.2019.04.033 · Cited by 15
Shareholder Perks and Firm Value
Karpoff, J. M., Schonlau, R. J., & Suzuki, K. (2020) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaa141 · Cited by 14
“Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and Faleye (2007) find that acquisition announcement returns 37 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3880620 and CEO-turnover sensitivity are lower in firms with entrenched managers.”
BackgroundResultManagement insulation and bank failures
Ferreira, D., Kershaw, D., Kirchmaier, T., & Schuster, E. (2021) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2021.100909 · Cited by 12
Dakhli, A., & Mtiraoui, A. (2021) · International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management · doi:10.1108/ijppm-07-2021-0401 · Cited by 15
Bargaining power of targets: Takeover defenses and top-tier target advisors
Ertugrul, M. (2014) · Journal of Economics and Business · doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2014.12.001 · Cited by 15
The effects of takeover defenses: Evidence from closed-end funds
Souther, M. E. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.005 · Cited by 15
Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear Impact of Employee Ownership on CEO entrenchment
Hollandts, X., Aubert, N. S., Abdelhamid, A. B., & Prieur, V. (2019) · Management international · doi:10.7202/1058165ar · Cited by 15
What Else Do Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by Firm ManagementPreprint
Soltes, E. F., Srinivasan, S., & Vijayaraghavan, R. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2771114 · Cited by 15
Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the Shareholder Rights ProjectPreprint
Cremers, M., & Sepe, S. M. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2962162 · Cited by 15
Enterprise Risk Management and Firm Value: The Role of Board Monitoring
Faisal, M., & Challen, A. E. (2021) · Asia Pacific Fraud Journal · doi:10.21532/apfjournal.v6i1.204 · Cited by 14
“Faleye (2007) examines classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment which shows that classified boards are associated with significant reductions in firm value and this relationship applies to companies that relate to the benefits of institutional stability.”
BackgroundIndependent directors’ connectedness and bank risk-taking
Amin, A. S., Mollah, S., Kamal, S., Zhao, Y., & Şimşek, R. (2024) · Journal of Financial Stability · doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101324 · Cited by 14
Environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance and abnormal positive tone
Yang, X., Bao, J., & Zhang, K. (2024) · Sustainability Accounting Management and Policy Journal · doi:10.1108/sampj-01-2024-0045 · Cited by 17
Regulating Draconian Takeover Defenses with Soft Law: Empirical Evidence from Event Studies in China
Zeng, J. S. (2019) · European Business Organization Law Review · doi:10.1007/s40804-019-00131-5 · Cited by 8
Chen, A. Y., Dechow, P., & Tan, S. T. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-026-09951-6 · Cited by 14
Corporate governance and investor reactions to seasoned equity offerings
Huang, R., & Tompkins, J. G. (2010) · Managerial Finance · doi:10.1108/03074351011050334 · Cited by 14
“Another working paper that is similar to ours in its approach is by Ferreira and Laux (2008). Like us, they also find that good governance structures improve the market’s reaction to SEO announcements.”
Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the EU Area
Ammann, M. J., Oesch, D., & Schmid, M. M. (2011) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1468-036x.2011.00605.x · Cited by 14
All-pervading insider bias alters review time in Turkish university journals
Tütüncü, L. (2023) · Scientometrics · doi:10.1007/s11192-023-04724-3 · Cited by 13
“In finance literature, entrenched managers are blamed for the increase in agency costs, loss of shareholder and firm value because they deviate from the goals of company and begin to pursue their own interests (Chang & Zhang, 2015; Faleye, 2007; Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Surroca & Tribo, 2008).”
BackgroundCEO social connections and bank systemic risk: The “dark side” of social networks
Manu, S. A., & Qi, Y. (2023) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106988 · Cited by 13
Corporate political activities and firms' carbon emissions
Amin, A. S., Hossain, M., Lee, N., & Saadi, S. (2025) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102862 · Cited by 13
Chiang, S., Kleinman, G., & Lee, P. (2017) · Review of Accounting and Finance · doi:10.1108/raf-01-2015-0006 · Cited by 13
Debt dynamic, debt dispersion and corporate governance
Tut, D. (2022) · International Journal of Managerial Finance · doi:10.1108/ijmf-10-2021-0522 · Cited by 11
Chen, S., Srinidhi, B. N., Su, L. N., & Tong, J. Y. (2017) · Australian Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0312896217718891 · Cited by 13
“The parameter estimates of other control variables are consistent with prior literature (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Faleye, 2007).”
ResultMonitoring or empowering CEOs? The moderating effect of shareholder rights
Dah, B. A. (2018) · Research in International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2018.06.006 · Cited by 13
Does Independent Industry Expertise Improve Board Effectiveness? Evidence From Bank CEO Turnovers
Chen, Z. (2018) · International Review of Finance · doi:10.1111/irfi.12236 · Cited by 13
“A staggered board deters takeover and hinders market discipline (e.g., Bebchuk et al. 2002), resulting in lower Tobin’s Q (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005) and reduced probability of forced CEO turnover at underperforming firms (Faleye 2007).”
BackgroundEstrutura do conselho de administração e valor das companhias brasileiras
Gondrige, E. D. O., Clemente, A., & Espejo, M. M. D. S. B. (2012) · DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) · Cited by 13
Shareholder Empowerment and Bank BailoutsPreprint
Ferreira, D. H. D. M., Kershaw, D. S., Kirchmaier, T., & Schuster, E. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2170392 · Cited by 13
Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?Preprint
Ganor, M. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.908668 · Cited by 13
Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder EngagementPreprint
Dey, A., Starkweather, A., & White, J. T. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3871948 · Cited by 13
Tütüncü, L. (2024) · Scientometrics · doi:10.1007/s11192-023-04905-0 · Cited by 13
“At the individual editor level, the study proposes, based on the entrenchment hypothesis (Faleye, 2007; Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Sur-roca & Tribo, 2008), that more entrenched editors are more likely to deviate from scientific goals and consequently would be more inclined to publish inside papers.”
Staggered board, social capital and sustainability
Likitapiwat, T., & Treepongkaruna, S. (2022) · Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management · doi:10.1002/csr.2435 · Cited by 12
Effects of takeover protection on earnings overstatements: evidence from restating firms
Zhao, Y., Chen, K. H., & Yao, L. J. (2009) · Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting · doi:10.1007/s11156-009-0128-9 · Cited by 12
“Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007) focus on the staggered board as a key antitakeover provision and document evidence that it entrenches managers and impairs firm value.”
BackgroundHeterogeneity in the Effect of Managerial Equity Incentives on Firm Value
Benson, B., James, H., & Park, J. (2019) · The Financial Review · doi:10.1111/fire.12185 · Cited by 14
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BUSINESS PERFORMANCE: THE MODERATING ROLE OF EXTERNAL AUDIT QUALITY
Wong, F. S., Ganesan, Y., Pitchay, A. A., Haron, H. B., & Hendayani, R. (2020) · Journal of Governance and Integrity · doi:10.15282/jgi.2.2.2019.5466 · Cited by 12
“This is also supported by the study of Faleye (2007) where the results reported a negative and significant relationship between age diversity (average director’s age) and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Based on the findings from Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) and Zimmerman (2008), there is no…”
ResultRisk management transparency and compensation
Kang, C., & Kim, D. (2022) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102245 · Cited by 3
Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement
Dey, A., Starkweather, A., & White, J. T. (2024) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhae045 · Cited by 12
Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams
Kiefer, M., Jones, E., & Adams, A. (2017) · Qualitative Research in Financial Markets · doi:10.1108/qrfm-04-2016-0014 · Cited by 11
Baldenius, T., Meng, X., & Qiu, L. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09586-9 · Cited by 12
“Faleye (2007) and Gal-Or et al. (2016) find staggered boards to be associated with lax monitoring.”
BackgroundDo Gay-Friendly Corporate Policies Enhance Firm Performance?Preprint
Blazovich, J. L., Cook, K. A., Huston, J. M., & Strawser, W. R. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2243189 · Cited by 12
Thirty Years of Change: The Evolution of Classified BoardsPreprint
Guernsey, S. B., Guo, F., Liu, T., & Serfling, M. A. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4085735 · Cited by 12
Decoding AI innovation: How R&D alliances drive technological breakthrough
Huang, Y., Song, F., & Liu, C. (2025) · Technology in Society · doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2025.103165 · Cited by 15
CEO facial trustworthiness and corporate governance
Bi, W., Wang, Y., Xiang, Y., & Zhang, F. F. (2022) · China Accounting and Finance Review · doi:10.1108/cafr-03-2022-0016 · Cited by 11
A survey of corporate governance: international trends and China's mode
Li, W., Xu, Y., Niu, J., & Qiu, A. (2012) · Nankai Business Review International · doi:10.1108/20408741211201890 · Cited by 11
Governance provisions and managerial entrenchment: evidence from CEO turnover of acquiring firms
Sokolyk, T. (2014) · Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting · doi:10.1007/s11156-014-0438-4 · Cited by 11
Executive Qualification and Firm Value
Rakhmayil, S., & Yüce, A. (2013) · Cited by 11
Recent Board Declassifications: A Response to Cremers and SepePreprint
Bebchuk, L. A., & Cohen, A. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2970629 · Cited by 11
Cash Holdings and Corporate Governance Around the WorldPreprint
Oesch, D. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1656569 · Cited by 11
CEO Power and Mergers and AcquisitionsPreprint
Gong, N., & Guo, L. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2404952 · Cited by 11
Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund VotingPreprint
Morgan, A., Poulsen, A. B., Wolf, J. G., & Yang, T. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1572049 · Cited by 11
Bank audit committee financial expertise and timely loan loss recognition
Choi, D. (2024) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12977 · Cited by 10
CEO turnover and director reputation
von Meyerinck, F., Romer, J., & Schmid, M. (2024) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103971 · Cited by 10
A game of thrones—Dynamics of internal CEO succession and outcome
Blank, D. B., II, Hadley, B., Minnick, K., & Rivolta, M. L. (2021) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/eufm.12311 · Cited by 12
The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms
Nakamura, E. (2010) · Review of Managerial Science · doi:10.1007/s11846-010-0044-3 · Cited by 10
“For example, Yermack (1996) shows that small boards tend to perform better, while Faleye (2007) suggests classified boards worsen firm management.”
BackgroundThe Ethical Implications of Ignoring Shareholder Directives to Remove Antitakeover Provisions
Howton, S. D., Howton, S. W., & McWilliams, V. B. (2008) · Business Ethics Quarterly · doi:10.5840/beq200818326 · Cited by 10
“Faleye (2007) finds that the presence of classified boards entrenches management and destroys firm value.”
BackgroundCorporate Governance in European BankingPreprint
Arnaboldi, F., & Casu, B. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1763134 · Cited by 10
Creating Controversy in Proxy Voting AdvicePreprint
Malenko, A., Malenko, N., & Spatt, C. S. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3843674 · Cited by 10
Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt IncentivesPreprint
Wei, C., & Yermack, D. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1462475 · Cited by 10
Optimizing corporate governance: unraveling the interplay of board structure and firm efficiency
Shabbir, M. F., Aslam, H. D., Oon, E. Y. N., & Amin, A. (2024) · Cogent Economics & Finance · doi:10.1080/23322039.2024.2396034 · Cited by 9
“However, Faleye (2007) exposed that the staggered board provision hurts the firm performance by insulating inefficient management.”
Creating Controversy in Proxy Voting Advice
Malenko, A., Malenko, N., & Spatt, C. S. (2025) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.13438 · Cited by 9
Staggered Boards, Agency Costs and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China
Mbanyele, W., & Huang, H. (2024) · Research In International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102489 · Cited by 7
Charitou, A., Georgiou, I., & Soteriou, A. C. (2016) · Multinational Finance Journal · doi:10.17578/20-3-1 · Cited by 9
“There is also literature on how board composition can destroy firm value (see for example Faleye, 2007, on how classified boards destroy firm value).”
BackgroundStaggered boards, accounting discretion and firm value
Jiraporn, P., & Liu, Y. (2011) · Applied Financial Economics · doi:10.1080/09603107.2010.530213 · Cited by 9
“Motivated by agency theory, the fundamental premise of this study is that staggered boards can make agency conflicts more severe by entrenching incompetent managers (Faleye, 2007).”
InfluentialDoes Delaware Entrench Management?Preprint
Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1120276 · Cited by 9
The effect of customer asset strategies on acquisition performance in business-to-government markets
Yan, S., Lee, J.-Y., & Josephson, B. W. (2023) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1007/s11747-023-00955-1 · Cited by 8
“Investment intensity is the acquirer’s capital expenses, divided by its total revenue (Faleye, 2007).”
Director Liability Protection and the Quality of Independent Directors
Masulis, R. W., Shen, S., & Zou, H. (2024) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.03743 · Cited by 8
Beyond commitment: entrenchment in the buyer–seller exchange
Jelinek, R. (2014) · Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management · doi:10.1080/08853134.2014.890904 · Cited by 8
“Consistent with the overwhelming majority of studies in the agency literature (cf. Faleye 2007; Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Surroca and Tribo 2008), entrenched sellers can and often will hurt these customers; they have the opportunity and a myriad of factors can provide the motivation.”
BackgroundOwnership Structure, Corporate Governance and Capital Structure of Non-Financial Firms of Pakistan
Ahmad, H., Akhter, N., Siddiq, T., & Iqbal, Z. (2018) · Information Management and Business Review · doi:10.22610/imbr.v10i1.2146 · Cited by 8
“Like the Fosberg (2004), Faleye (2007) also reports the positive relationship between CEO duality and capital structure, he provides the explanation for this relationship that Duality in leadership may lessens the problem of information asymmetry in turn this leads to higher access to external…”
BackgroundCEO risk preferences, hedging intensity, and firm value
Chowdhury, R., Doukas, J. A., & Mandal, S. (2022) · Journal of International Money and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2022.102751 · Cited by 8
Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
Hori, K., & Osano, H. (2009) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2009.06.001 · Cited by 8
The governance mechanisms of family-controlled REITs
Chang, E. P. C., & Noguera, M. C. (2016) · Journal of Family Business Management · doi:10.1108/jfbm-02-2015-0012 · Cited by 8
Board of directors’ composition and performance in French CAC 40 listed firms
Ahmadi, A. A., & Bouri, A. (2017) · Accounting · doi:10.5267/j.ac.2017.1.001 · Cited by 8
“Similarly, Faleye (2007) found that CEO duality was positively correlated to organizational complexity, the CEO reputation and the level of managerial ownership.”
BackgroundCEO networks and the labor market for directors
Kim, H., Fahlenbrach, R., & Low, A. (2022) · Journal of Empirical Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jempfin.2022.11.001 · Cited by 8
Deng, X., Gao, H., & Liu, W. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2112880 · Cited by 8
“For example, Core et al. (1999) and Faleye (2007) find that in firms where boards are less capable of providing effective corporate governance, CEOs tend to receive higher compensation, and their pay tends to be less sensitive to firm performance.”
Director Liability Protection and Board QualityPreprint
Masulis, R. W., Shen, S., & Zou, H. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3329220 · Cited by 8
Two Stories About Shareholders
Tingle, B. C. (2021) · Osgoode Hall law journal · doi:10.60082/2817-5069.3632 · Cited by 7
Zhao, C. (2022) · Social Sciences · doi:10.3390/socsci11030099 · Cited by 7
The Bright Side of Staggered Boards: Evidence from Labor Investment Efficiency
Le, A., Huang, H. H., & Do, T. K. (2024) · Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jcae.2024.100439 · Cited by 7
Wang, K., Xue, K., Xu, J.-H., Chu, C., Tsai, S., Fan, H., Wang, Z., & Wang, J. (2018) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su10051412 · Cited by 7
“For example, Faleye (2007) analyzes the relationship between a staggered board provision and executive compensation and CEO turnover, and finds that the existence of this provision can decrease board monitoring efficiency, which harms performance [3].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Faleye, O.
- Affiliations
- Northeastern University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Faleye, Olubunmi
- ORCID
- Faleye, Olubunmi
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-02
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 501-529
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2148416404
- Cited by
- 550
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 31 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 31
- FWCI
- 73.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- classified boards, firm value, managerial entrenchment, board accountability, CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, shareholder resolutions, market discipline, corporate governance
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