The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Citations
Cites
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 7,585
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,659
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,275
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
Coles, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 · Cited by 3,045
A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q
Chung, K. H., & Pruitt, S. W. (1994) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3665623 · Cited by 2,460
Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90002-h · Cited by 1,937
Stock prices and top management changes
Warner, J. B., Watts, R. L., & Wruck, K. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90054-2 · Cited by 1,649
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Wilcox, 2002, Two cheers for staggered boards, Corporate Governance Advisor, 10, 1
Cited by
Sorted by citations
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,368
The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance
Carter, D. A., D’Souza, F. P., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010) · Corporate Governance An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00809.x · Cited by 1,853
“Multiple studies show that asset size is related to Tobin’s Q (Faleye, 2007; Prevost et al., 2002; Yermack, 1996).”
BackgroundColes, J. L., Daniel, N. D., & Naveen, L. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu011 · Cited by 1,000
Hwang, B., & Kim, S. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.07.005 · Cited by 933
“Board consultants in the popular press broach this issue, saying that when directors debate whether or how to fire a CEO, ‘‘they [the directors] typically need the most help in dealing with their attachment to the CEO’’ (Business Week, 2007), and academic studies find weaker sensitivity of turnover to performance with…”
InfluentialThe incentives for tax planning
Armstrong, C., Blouin, J. L., & Larcker, D. F. (2011) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.04.001 · Cited by 863
“32 Next, we use data from FactSet SharkRepellent to measure board structure similar to Gompers et al. (2003), Daines and Klausner (2001), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), and Faleye (2007).”
MethodThe costs of intense board monitoring
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 · Cited by 821
“Faleye et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 101 (2011) 160–181 161”
Self-citationDo corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?
Minnick, K., & Noga, T. J. (2010) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.08.005 · Cited by 612
“Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007) argue that staggered boards protect management from removal.”
BackgroundCorporate governance and firm value: International evidence
Ammann, M. J., Oesch, D., & Schmid, M. M. (2010) · Journal of Empirical Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jempfin.2010.10.003 · Cited by 495
“(Yermack, 1996), equity capital structure (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010), or whether the board is classified (e.g., Faleye, 2007).”
Do Better-Connected CEOs Innovate More?
Faleye, O., Kovacs, T., & Venkateswaran, A. (2011) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109014000714 · Cited by 418
“We obtain forced CEO turnover data for 1997–2002 from Faleye (2007) and extend the data to 2006 following the same methodology as in that study.”
InfluentialSelf-citationDo takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers
Cain, M. D., McKeon, S. B., & Solomon, S. D. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.003 · Cited by 395
Female directors and earnings management: Evidence from UK companies
Arun, T. G., Almahrog, Y. E., & Aribi, Z. A. (2015) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2015.03.002 · Cited by 381
“We identify high debt firms as those that rely more on debt financing, with larger boards and more independent directors (Coles et al. 2008; Faleye 2007).”
BackgroundResultThe market reaction to corporate governance regulation
Larcker, D. F., Ormazábal, G., & Taylor, D. J. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.002 · Cited by 354
“Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007) correlate staggered boards with Tobin’s Q and find a negative relation.”
InfluentialBoard Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers
Guo, L., & Masulis, R. W. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv038 · Cited by 334
How much of the diversification discount can be explained by poor corporate governance?
Hoechle, D., Schmid, M., Walter, I., & Yermack, D. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.025 · Cited by 326
“This result suggests that the (weak) negative relation between firm value and a classified board documented in Table 3 is mainly associated with diversified firms (see Faleye, 2007).”
InfluentialCEO duality and firm performance: Evidence from an exogenous shock to the competitive environment
Yang, T., & Zhao, S. (2014) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.04.008 · Cited by 314
“Their results are in contrast to Faleye (2007b), who finds that dual leadership increases Tobin’s Q for complex firms but decreases it for non-complex firms.”
Investor Reactions to CEOs' Inside Debt Incentives
Wei, C., & Yermack, D. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr028 · Cited by 293
Endogeneity in CEO power: A survey and experiment
Li, Z. F. (2016) · Investment Analysts Journal · doi:10.1080/10293523.2016.1151985 · Cited by 261
“…equipment (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007), independent directors, G Index, CEO total compensation, CEO payperformance sensitivity, return on assets (Faleye, 2007), firm age (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2009), leverage, firm volatility, and Delaware company dummy, all of which…”
Firm Age and PerformancePreprint
Loderer, C. F., & Waelchli, U. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1342248 · Cited by 269
“Moreover, it is distinct from such phenomena as sample selection, concave investment opportunity sets, financial frictions (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001; Clementi, 2002), declining investor uncertainty (Pástor and Veronesi, 2003), increasing diversification (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004), post-IPO regularities…”
BackgroundShareholder Voting and Corporate Governance
Yermack, D. (2010) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-073009-104034 · Cited by 243
Labor-Friendly Corporate Practices: Is What is Good for Employees Good for Shareholders?
Faleye, O., & Trahan, E. A. (2011) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-010-0705-9 · Cited by 251
“We also follow the approach used in Faleye et al. (2006) and include performance variables around the event (naming to the Fortune list) as control variables.”
MethodInfluentialSelf-citationStaggered boards and long-term firm value, revisited
Cremers, M., Litov, L. P., & Sepe, S. M. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.08.003 · Cited by 210
CEO Replacement in Turnaround Situations: Executive (Mis)Fit and Its Performance Implications
Chen, G., & Hambrick, D. C. (2011) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1100.0629 · Cited by 219
“Under this view, grounded in agency theory, CEO replacement needs to happen more often than it does (Faleye 2007, Warner et al. 1988).”
BackgroundCan CSR Disclosure Protect Firm Reputation During Financial Restatements?
Zhang, L., Shan, Y. G., & Chang, M. (2020) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-020-04527-z · Cited by 218
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control
Bates, T. W., Becher, D. A., & Lemmon, M. L. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.007 · Cited by 210
“In keeping with the 8 notion that board classification facilitates managerial entrenchment, Faleye (2007) finds that classification reduces the probability of forced CEO turnover, is associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance, and is correlated with a lower sensitivity…”
InfluentialNot All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs
Ryngaert, M. D., & Thomas, S. (2012) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2012.00437.x · Cited by 185
Staggered Boards and Earnings Management
Zhao, Y., & Chen, K. H. (2008) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2008.83.5.1347 · Cited by 183
Founder Replacement and Startup Performance
Ewens, M., & Marx, M. (2016) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx130 · Cited by 180
Edmans, A. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108860093 · Cited by 182
Ahmadi, A. A., Nakaa, N., & Bouri, A. (2017) · Research in International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.083 · Cited by 169
Corporate governance, compensation consultants, and CEO pay levels
Armstrong, C. S., Ittner, C. D., & Larcker, D. F. (2012) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-012-9182-y · Cited by 169
Takeover protection and managerial myopia: Evidence from real earnings management
Zhao, Y., Chen, K., Zhang, Y., & Davis, M. L. (2011) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2011.08.004 · Cited by 168
A Reexamination of Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Johnson, S. A., Moorman, T. C., & Sorescu, S. M. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp018 · Cited by 163
What I Like About You: A Multilevel Study of Shareholder Discontent with Director Monitoring
Hillman, A. J., Shropshire, C., Certo, S. T., Dalton, D. R., & Dalton, C. M. (2010) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1100.0542 · Cited by 169
“Governance critics argue that classified boards entrench management and destroy shareholder value (Faleye 2007).”
Board diversity and firm performance: evidence from the U.K. SMEs
Shehata, N. F., Salhin, A., & El-Helaly, M. (2017) · Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/00036846.2017.1293796 · Cited by 164
“On the other hand, Murray (1989) and Kunze, Boehm, and Bruch (2011) reported a negative association between age diversity and firm performance, while Faleye (2007) reported a negative and significant association between average director age and Tobin’s Q.”
BackgroundBoard Committees in Corporate Governance: A Cross‐Disciplinary Review and Agenda for the Future
Kolev, K. D., Wangrow, D. B., Barker, V. L., & Schepker, D. J. (2019) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.12444 · Cited by 160
“Similarly, Faleye (2007) found nominating committee independence was associated with a 12 to 14 per cent lower market return.”
BackgroundDo LGBT-supportive Corporate Policies Enhance Firm Performance?
Pichler, S. M., Blazovich, J. L., Cook, K. A., Huston, J. M., & Strawser, W. R. (2015) · Human Resource Management · doi:10.1002/hrm.21831 · Cited by 158
“Prior research (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007; Faleye & Trahan, 2011; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Yermack, 1996) demonstrates that these variables influence firm value, productivity, and profitability and thus represent necessary controls when examining the association between…”
Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure
Faleye, O. (2007) · Journal of Management & Governance · doi:10.1007/s10997-007-9028-3 · Cited by 158
Self-citationBoard Networks and Corporate Innovation
Chang, C., & Wu, Q. (2020) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3587 · Cited by 158
Yuan, G., Chen, J., & Liu, R. (2024) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103495 · Cited by 159
Product Market Competition and Internal Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes Oxley Act
Chhaochharia, V., Grinstein, Y., Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2012) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2409 · Cited by 150
“This measure has also been identified in the literature as an indicator of managerial entrenchment (e.g., Faleye (2007) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)).”
BackgroundProduct Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the EU Area
Ammann, M. J., Oesch, D., & Schmid, M. M. (2013) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1468-036x.2010.00605.x · Cited by 146
“Board characteristics (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Faleye, 2007), CEO ownership and power (e.”
How do staggered boards affect shareholder value? Evidence from a natural experiment
Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.005 · Cited by 146
Zorn, M. L., Shropshire, C., Martin, J. A., Combs, J. G., & Ketchen, D. J. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2661 · Cited by 139
It’s who you know that counts: Board connectedness and CSR performance
Amin, A. S., Chourou, L., Kamal, S., Malik, M., & Zhao, Y. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101662 · Cited by 140
“[Insert Table 6 about here] We implement two additional empirical estimation strategies (outlined in Faleye et al. (2014), Faleye (2007) and Cheng (2008)) to address concerns related to reverse causality.”
Mubeen, R., Han, D.-P., Abbas, J., & Hussain, I. (2020) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su12083480 · Cited by 124
“Additionally, in a weak and political organizational structure, the CEO might misuse his/her dual power and appoint a closely linked person as a director who is likely to perform according to the CEO’s direction [29].”
BackgroundRisky lending: Does bank corporate governance matter?
Faleye, O., & Krishnan, K. (2017) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.06.011 · Cited by 132
Self-citationWhat's in a vote? The short- and long-run impact of dual-class equity on IPO firm values
Smart, S., Thirumalai, R. S., & Zutter, C. J. (2007) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.07.002 · Cited by 130
Accounting restatements, governance and municipal debt financing
Baber, W. R., Gore, A. K., Rich, K. T., & Zhang, J. X. (2013) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.08.003 · Cited by 128
The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Financial PerformancePreprint
Carter, D. A., D’Souza, F. P., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1106698 · Cited by 126
“15 For example, see Yermack (1996), Prevost, Rao, and Hossain (2002), and Faleye (2007).”
BackgroundEarnings quality and corporate cash holdings
Sun, Q., Yung, K. K., & Rahman, H. (2011) · Accounting and Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1467-629x.2010.00394.x · Cited by 125
Entrenchment, governance, and the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths
Salas, J. M. (2009) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.09.002 · Cited by 121
Mutual monitoring and corporate governance
Li, Z. F. (2014) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.12.008 · Cited by 118
Earnings Management and CSR Disclosure. Family vs. Non-Family Firms
Gavana, G., Gottardo, P., & Moisello, A. M. (2017) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su9122327 · Cited by 118
Understanding Uncontested Director Elections
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Oesch, D. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2760 · Cited by 117
“If these directors or, more generally, firms with classified boards are less responsive (Faleye 2007), we may overstate the rate of responsiveness to individual-level recommendations.”
Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors?
Devos, E., Prevost, A. K., & Puthenpurackal, J. J. (2008) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1755-053x.2009.01059.x · Cited by 115
“classified boards (Faleye, 2007), and number of external appointments held by directors (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003).”
BackgroundWincent, J., Anokhin, S. A., & Boter, H. (2008) · R and D Management · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9310.2008.00539.x · Cited by 114
Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards
Guo, R.-J., Kruse, T. A., & Nohel, T. (2008) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.007 · Cited by 113
Pay Gap and Performance in China
Banker, R. D., Bu, D., & Mehta, M. N. (2016) · Abacus · doi:10.1111/abac.12082 · Cited by 111
The Effect of Corporate Governance on Auditor-Client Realignments
Cassell, C. A., Giroux, G. A., Myers, L. A., & Omer, T. C. (2012) · Auditing A Journal of Practice & Theory · doi:10.2308/ajpt-10240 · Cited by 110
Mubeen, R., Han, D., Abbas, J., Otero, S. Á., & Sial, M. S. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.669715 · Cited by 110
“Moreover, CEOs can take advantage of their dual role in a weak structure and assign closer individuals executive positions through CEO directives (Faleye, 2007).”
BackgroundIs board compensation excessive?
Dah, M. A., & Frye, M. B. (2017) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.06.001 · Cited by 109
Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting
Morgan, A., Poulsen, A. B., Wolf, J. G., & Yang, T. (2011) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.002 · Cited by 108
Role of institutions in shaping corporate governance system: evidence from emerging economy
Arslan, M., & Alqatan, A. (2020) · Heliyon · doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e03520 · Cited by 147
“…have studied the general effects of voting restrictions on fi rm value and performance, often fi nding that fi rms perform worse in presence of voting restrictions (Gompers et al., 2003), staggered boards (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007) and dual class voting structures (Gompers et al., 2009).”
BackgroundBoard diversity and investment efficiency: evidence from China
Ullah, I., Zeb, A., Khan, M. A., & Xiao, W. Z. (2020) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-01-2020-0001 · Cited by 107
Corporate social responsibility and CEO compensation structure
Karim, K. E., Lee, E., & Suh, S. (2017) · Advances in Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.adiac.2017.11.002 · Cited by 106
“17 Following Faleye (2007), we use Tobin's Q as a proxy for firm value.”
Why Do Cities Hoard Cash? Determinants and Implications of Municipal Cash Holdings
Gore, A. K. (2009) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.183 · Cited by 103
Why Do Firms Engage in Selective Hedging? Evidence from the Gold Mining Industry
Adam, T., Fernando, C. S., & Salas, J. M. (2015) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.05.006 · Cited by 103
“15 See, for example, Faleye (2007). 16 See, for example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), and Ryan and Wiggins (2004). 17 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998), Gillan and Starks (2000), and Hartzell and Starks (2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialFos, V., Li, K., & Tsoutsoura, M. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhx078 · Cited by 100
Local religious norms, corporate social responsibility, and firm value
Zolotoy, L., O’Sullivan, D., & Chen, Y. (2019) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.01.015 · Cited by 107
Does the director election system matter? Evidence from majority voting
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F., & Oesch, D. (2014) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-014-9284-9 · Cited by 97
Hirschey, M. J., Skiba, H., & Wintoki, M. B. (2012) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.02.002 · Cited by 97
“R&D spending is often used as a proxy for information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors (e.g., Faleye, 2007; Wintoki, 2007), managerial discretion (e.g., Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999), product differentiation or growth opportunities (e.g. Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Elliot,…”
BackgroundManagerial entrenchment and earnings management
Meo, F. D., Lara, J. M. G., & Surroca, J. A. (2017) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2017.07.003 · Cited by 94
“Faleye (2007) controls for CEO age to determine the probability of managerial turnover, which is related to managerial entrenchment.”
BackgroundAnalyst following, staggered boards, and managerial entrenchment
Jiraporn, P., Chintrakarn, P., & Kim, Y. S. (2012) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.07.013 · Cited by 90
Capital Structure, Staggered Boards, and Firm Value
Jiraporn, P., & Liu, Y. (2008) · Financial Analysts Journal · doi:10.2469/faj.v64.n1.7 · Cited by 90
Internal and external discipline following securities class actions
Humphery‐Jenner, M. (2011) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.001 · Cited by 90
CEO duality and firm performance in the U.S. restaurant industry: Moderating role of restaurant type
Guillet, B. D., Seo, K., Küçükusta, D., & Lee, S. (2012) · International Journal of Hospitality Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2012.10.004 · Cited by 88
Brown, J. A., Anderson, A. M., Salas, J. M., & Ward, A. J. (2017) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2017.1123 · Cited by 84
““staggered”) or not, as directors on classified boards have been seen to be controversial in the eyes shareholders (Faleye, 2007).”
BackgroundOn Lawsuits, Corporate Governance, and Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance
Gillan, S., & Panasian, C. A. (2014) · Journal of Risk & Insurance · doi:10.1111/jori.12043 · Cited by 86
Carbon emissions, corporate governance, and staggered boards
Tanthanongsakkun, S., Treepongkaruna, S., & Jiraporn, P. (2022) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.3174 · Cited by 85
The impact of multinationality on firm value: A comparative analysis of machine learning techniques
Kuzey, C., Uyar, A., & Delen, D. (2013) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2013.11.001 · Cited by 82
Zhou, F., Fan, Y., An, Y., & Zhong, L. (2017) · Pacific-Basin Finance Journal · doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2017.02.003 · Cited by 80
Takeover protection and stock price crash risk: Evidence from state antitakeover laws
Bhargava, R., Faircloth, S., & Zeng, H. (2017) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.08.021 · Cited by 74
Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature
Straska, M., & Waller, H. (2013) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109014000532 · Cited by 65
“9 While some report an insignificant market reaction or a negative one (Linn and McConnell (1983), Gillan and Starks (2000)), others report a positive market reaction (Faleye (2007), Guo, Kruse, and Nohel (2008), and Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012)). To address the fact that the short-term event studies generally re…”
InfluentialUpheaval in the boardroom: Outside director public resignations, motivations, and consequences
Dewally, M., & Peck, S. W. (2009) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.02.002 · Cited by 78
“Faleye (2007) using a sample from 1995 to 2002 documents 219 forced CEO turnovers among 1483 CEO replacements suggesting that CEO turnovers that are discipline related occur 14.77% of the time.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe conditional nature of the value of corporate governance
Chi, J. D., & Lee, D. S. (2009) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.08.001 · Cited by 78
“, Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, the empirical evidence is inconclusive as to whether board structure is related to firm valuation. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that board structure is endogenously determined by other governance and operational characteristics, and therefore no relation between board structure…”
Chakravarty, S., & Rutherford, L. G. (2017) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.02.001 · Cited by 75
Field, L., & Lowry, M. (2022) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.06.004 · Cited by 40
“This 1 For evidence on classified boards, see Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Faleye (2007), and Guo, Kruse and Nohel (2008), among others.”
How Much of the Diversification Discount Can be Explained by Poor Corporate Governance?Preprint
Hoechle, D., Schmid, M., Walter, I., & Yermack, D. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1341006 · Cited by 71
Optimal inside debt compensation and the value of equity and debt
Campbell, T. C., Galpin, N. E., & Johnson, S. A. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.003 · Cited by 70
Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens UnitedPreprint
Coates, J. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1975421 · Cited by 70
Garba, T., & Abubakar, B. (2014) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 68
CEO turnover in China: the role of market-based and accounting performance measures
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2012) · European Journal of Finance · doi:10.1080/1351847x.2012.676559 · Cited by 67
Staggered Boards, Managerial Entrenchment, and Dividend Policy
Jiraporn, P., & Chintrakarn, P. (2009) · Journal of Financial Services Research · doi:10.1007/s10693-009-0059-6 · Cited by 64
Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence From Mutual Fund VotingPreprint
Morgan, A., Poulsen, A. B., Wolf, J. G., & Yang, T. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1431072 · Cited by 61
Do staggered boards harm shareholders?
Yakov Amihud, A., & Stoyanov, S. V. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.04.002 · Cited by 60
Classified Boards, the Cost of Debt, and Firm Performance
Chen, D. (2012) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.07.015 · Cited by 59
CEO Compensation Contagion: Evidence from an Exogenous Shock
Bereskin, F., & Cicero, D. C. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.005 · Cited by 60
Are outside directors with greater board tenure valuable? Evidence from the last credit crisis
Fernandes, N. G., & Fich, E. M. (2022) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107037 · Cited by 58
“Both theoretical work (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) and empirical papers (e.g. Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997, Bebchuk and Cohen 2005, and Faleye, 2007) argue that topmanagement entrenchment is detrimental to firm value.”
BackgroundCorporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs
Campbell, R. D., Ghosh, C., Petrova, M., & Sirmans, C. F. (2009) · The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics · doi:10.1007/s11146-009-9202-2 · Cited by 58
“Focusing on CEO turnover, executive compensation, and proxy contests, Faleye (2007, 2009) concludes that classified boards significantly insulate management from market discipline, inducing a significant reduction in firm value.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Faleye, O.
- Affiliations
- Northeastern University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Faleye, Olubunmi
- ORCID
- Faleye, Olubunmi
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-02
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 501-529
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2148416404
- Cited by
- 550
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 31 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 31
- FWCI
- 73.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- classified boards, firm value, managerial entrenchment, board accountability, CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, shareholder resolutions, market discipline, corporate governance
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
