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Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment

Faleye, Olubunmi·2007·Journal of Financial Economics

DOI 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.01.005

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Authors: Faleye, O.
Affiliations: Northeastern University (US)
Corresponding author: Faleye, Olubunmi
ORCID: Faleye, Olubunmi
Venue: Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Published: 2007-02
Volume: 83
Issue: 2
Pages: 501-529
ISSN: 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.01.005
OpenAlex: W2148416404
Cited by: 550
References: 38
Citations by year: 2026: 21 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 31 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 31
FWCI: 73.66
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Licence: www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license (tdm)
Locations: Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
Keywords: classified boards, firm value, managerial entrenchment, board accountability, CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, shareholder resolutions, market discipline, corporate governance

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Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment

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