The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation
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Citations
Cites
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Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
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Self-citationAn Analysis of Stock Recommendations
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Bolton, P., Freixas, X., & Shapiro, J. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.06.004 · Cited by 221
Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection
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Information Acquisition in Financial Markets
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Credit-Rating Shopping, Selection and the Equilibrium Structure of RatingsPreprint
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Reputation and competition: evidence from the credit rating industryPreprint
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Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information: Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding
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Cited by
BOLTON, P., FREIXAS, X., & SHAPIRO, J. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01708.x · Cited by 940
How did increased competition affect credit ratings?
Becker, B., & Milbourn, T. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.012 · Cited by 676
Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies
White, L. J. (2010) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.2.211 · Cited by 603
Rating agencies in the face of regulation
Opp, C. C., Opp, M. M., & Harris, M. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.011 · Cited by 382
Good disclosure, bad disclosure
Goldstein, I., & Yang, L. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.08.004 · Cited by 338
Metadata
- Authors
- Skreta, V., & Veldkamp, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Monetary Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-07
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 678-695
- ISSN
- 0304-3932 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125041422
- Cited by
- 460
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 58.82
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.