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Taxpayer information assistance services and tax compliance behavior
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Alm, J., Cherry, T., Jones, M., & McKee, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Psychology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-08
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 577-586
- ISSN
- 0167-4870 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2168806987
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 23.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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