An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825 · cited 4×
“…2001; Mitias and Turnbull, 2001; Oates, 1991; Turnbull, 1998). warm glow from giving (imperfect altruism) can lead to incomplete crowding out.2 We draw on the models of Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Andreoni (1989, 1990), modifying their approach to include the possibility of fiscal illusion.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAltruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0081 · Cited by 1,126 · cited 2×
“We show in an earlier study that subjects donate significantly more when the recipient of their donation is a charitable organization rather than an anonymous subject (Eckel and Grossman, 1996).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationList, J. A., & Lucking‐Reiley, D. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/324392 · Cited by 535 · cited 2×
“List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) field test the effect of seed money by an initial contributor, and find a positive impact.”
Background
Cited by
Engel, C. (2011) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9283-7 · Cited by 1,783
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0899764010380927 · Cited by 1,503
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Voluntary Sector Review · doi:10.1332/204080511x6087712 · Cited by 457
The Market for Charitable Giving
List, J. A. (2011) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.2.157 · Cited by 365
Avoiding overhead aversion in charity
Gneezy, U., Keenan, E. A., & Gneezy, A. (2014) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1253932 · Cited by 331
An experimental test of warm glow giving
Crumpler, H., & Grossman, P. J. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.014 · Cited by 318
Self-citationDo you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab
Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2010.10.006 · Cited by 286
Is there a hidden cost of imposing a minimum contribution level for public good contributions?
Kocher, M. G., Martinsson, P., Persson, E., & Wang, X. (2016) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.007 · Cited by 31
“Existing studies have analyzed the effects of an MCL, often framed as a tax, on voluntary contributions using public goods experiments (e.g., Andreoni, 1993; Chan et al., 2002; Sutter and Weck-Hanneman, 2004; Eckel et al., 2005; Gronberg et al., 2012).”
Olivola, C. Y., & Sussman, A. B. (2015) · The Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Psychology · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107706552.021 · Cited by 16
De Meyst, K., Cardinaels, E., & Van den Abbeele, A. G. H. L. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2645965 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Eckel, C. C., Grossman, P. J., & Johnston, R. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1543-1560
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2153653459
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 21.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.