The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Anonymity in giving in a natural context—a field experiment in 30 churches
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
Introduction to the Economics of Religion
Iannaccone, L. R. (1998) · Journal of Economic Literature · Cited by 2,096
Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Reply
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.340 · Cited by 1,158
Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L. (2000) · Bargaining and Market Behavior · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528347.009 · Cited by 979
Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
Théorie, G. D. E. D., David Masclet, B., NOUSSAIR, C. N., Tucker, S. J., & Villeval, M. C. (2001) · Cited by 843
Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising
Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00040-9 · Cited by 740
The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations
Rege, M., & Telle, K. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00021-5 · Cited by 665
Public goods provision in an experimental environment
Mark Isaac, R., McCue, K. F., & Plott, C. R. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90038-6 · Cited by 593
List, J. A., & Lucking‐Reiley, D. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/324392 · Cited by 535 · cited 1×
“List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) report the positive effect of publicly announcing amounts of dseed moneyT, indicating that individuals take the amount already given by others into account in making their own contribution decision.”
BackgroundHarbaugh, W. T. (1998) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(97)00062-5 · Cited by 529
The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers
Harbaugh, W. T. (1998) · American Economic Review · Cited by 523
Collective action as a social exchange
Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (1999) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00045-1 · Cited by 491
The informational value of sequential fundraising
Vesterlund, L. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00187-6 · Cited by 462
Rebate versus matching: does how we subsidize charitable contributions matter?
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2003) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00094-9 · Cited by 378
Engineering altruism: a theoretical and experimental investigation of anonymity and gift giving
Burnham, T. C. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00044-6 · Cited by 300
Social ties in a public good experiment
van Dijk, F., Sonnemans, J., & van Winden, F. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00090-1 · Cited by 184
What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence
Andreoni, J., Brown, P. M., & Vesterlund, L. (2002) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0904 · Cited by 155
SIMULTANEOUS DETERMINATION OF CHURCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND CHURCH ATTENDANCE
Sullivan, D. H. (1985) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1985.tb01767.x · Cited by 100
Rebates Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?Preprint
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 67
Free riding and the provision of candy bars
HAAN, M. A., & Kooreman, P. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00157-2 · Cited by 47
Group size and the free-rider hypothesis: An examination of new evidence from churches
Lipford, J. W. (1995) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01047748 · Cited by 40
Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving
Zaleski, P. A., & Zech, C. E. (1994) · Review of Religious Research · doi:10.2307/3511406 · Cited by 37
Optimal Church Size: The Bigger the Better?
Stonebraker, R. J. (1993) · Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion · doi:10.2307/1386662 · Cited by 29
Cited by
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.1.544 · Cited by 1,753
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0899764010380927 · Cited by 1,503
Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7384 · Cited by 1,081
Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory
Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.3.990 · Cited by 607
Metadata
- Authors
- Soetevent, A. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 11-12
- Pages
- 2301-2323
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2045937644
- Cited by
- 304
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 20.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.