Cited by 1,753Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesNonprofit Sector and VolunteeringDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially

Ariely, Dan, Bracha, Anat, Meier, Stephan·2009·American Economic Review

Abstract

This paper experimentally examines image motivation—the desire to be liked and well regarded by others—as a driver in prosocial behavior (doing good), and asks whether extrinsic monetary incentives (doing well) have a detrimental effect on prosocial behavior due to crowding out of image motivation. Using the unique property of image motivation—its dependency on visibility—we show that image is indeed an important part of the motivation to behave prosocially, and that extrinsic incentives crowd out image motivation. Therefore, monetary incentives are more likely to be counterproductive for public prosocial activities than for private ones. (JEL D64, L31, Z13)

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/aer.99.1.544

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52 of 52 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Rewards can be counterproductive if they conflict with individuals' motivations or goals.

    “Thus, rewards can be counterproductive if they conflict with individuals ' motivations or goals (Ariely et al. 2009; Deci et al. 1999).”
  • Monetary incentives have neutral or negative effects on prosocial behavior in public settings but positive effects in private settings.

    “In field experiments, Ariely et al. (2009) and Ashraf et al. (2014), for example, find that monetary incentives have neutral or negative effects on prosocial behavior in public settings but positive effects in private settings.”
  • Consideration of both reputation and others' approval may prevent neural effects from translating into explicit changes in behavior.

    “Although oxytocin significantly reduces amygdala representations of social values, consideration of both reputation 44 and others' approval 45 may prevent neural effects from translating into explicit changes in behavior.”

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Authors
Ariely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S.
Affiliations
  • Duke University (US)
  • Tel Aviv University (IL)
  • Columbia University (US)
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2009-02-01
Volume
99
Issue
1
Pages
544-555
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3122012753
Cited by
1,753
References
52
Citations by year
2026: 64 · 2025: 84 · 2024: 106 · 2023: 119 · 2022: 106 · 2021: 164 · 2020: 123 · 2019: 162 · 2018: 123 · 2017: 123 · 2016: 85 · 2015: 119 · 2014: 105 · 2013: 79 · 2012: 66
FWCI
157.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
prosocial behavior, financial incentives, crowding out, extrinsic rewards, visibility, social reputation, public goods

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