Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
How does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources--an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. When local--or central--governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent. Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Tiebout, C. M. (1956) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257839 · Cited by 13,222
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
The causes of corruption: a cross-national study
Treisman, D. (2000) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00092-4 · Cited by 3,889
Self-citationShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118402 · Cited by 3,778
Financial and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?
BECK, T., DEMIRGÜÇ‐KUNT, A., & MAKSIMOVIC, V. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00727.x · Cited by 2,557
Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/432166 · Cited by 2,385
THE DANGERS OF DECENTRALIZATION
Prud'homme, R. (1995) · The World Bank Research Observer · doi:10.1093/wbro/10.2.201 · Cited by 1,880
Rents, Competition, and Corruption
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.982 · Cited by 1,763
The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution
Ballentine, J. G., Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1981) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1057953 · Cited by 1,720
Eight Questions about Corruption
Svensson, J. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357860 · Cited by 1,699
Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy
Spengler, J. J. (1950) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256964 · Cited by 1,614
Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Olken, B. A. (2007) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/517935 · Cited by 1,593
Treisman, D. (2007) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.095418 · Cited by 1,477
Self-citationFederalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China
Montinola, G., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1995) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.1995.0003 · Cited by 1,328
The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution.
Prest, A. R., Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1981) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2553704 · Cited by 1,324
Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00158-4 · Cited by 1,309
Federalism: origin, operation, significance
Riker, W. H. (1964) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,221
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303321675437 · Cited by 1,219
Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style
Jin, H., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.11.008 · Cited by 1,172
Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels
Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.2.135 · Cited by 1,060
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
Svensson, J. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535180 · Cited by 1,036
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802762024539 · Cited by 980
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6727 · Cited by 915
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990
Mainwaring, S., Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2001) · Latin American Politics and Society · doi:10.2307/3177153 · Cited by 904
Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Olken, B. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11753 · Cited by 824
Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model
Seabright, P. (1996) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00055-0 · Cited by 820
Bank supervision and corruption in lending
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2006) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.10.014 · Cited by 535
DECENTRALISATION AS AN INCENTIVE SCHEME
SALMON, P. (1987) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/3.2.24 · Cited by 515
Decentralization and political institutions
Enikolopov, R., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.006 · Cited by 502
Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603770383424 · Cited by 445
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
KUNICOVÁ, J., & ROSE-ACKERMAN, S. (2005) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123405000311 · Cited by 435
Barth, J. R., Lin, C., Lin, P., & Song, F. M. (2009) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.04.003 · Cited by 430
Self-citationAnnual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1999
Pleskovic, B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/0-8213-4905-8 · Cited by 412
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
Kunicová, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2009) · Corruption, Development and Institutional Design · doi:10.1057/9780230242173_1 · Cited by 407
Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style
Zhuravskaya, E. V. (2000) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00090-0 · Cited by 347
Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?
Keen, M. J., & Kotsogiannis, C. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282802760015784 · Cited by 345
Which Countries Have State Religions?
Barro, R. J., & McCleary, R. M. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097515 · Cited by 341
Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2004) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.442900 · Cited by 333
Cai, H., & Treisman, D. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201314 · Cited by 311
Self-citationFinancial and Legal Constraints to Firm Growth: Does Size Matter?
Maksimovic, V., Beck, T., & Demirguc-Kunt, A. (2002) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2784 · Cited by 298
Decentralization and the Quality of Government
Treisman, D. S., Bannerjee, S., Bloom, S., Rushakov, A., Keat, P., Cox, G. W., Frye, T., Kraay, A., Geddes, B., Keen, M., et al. (2000) · Cited by 290
Self-citationStepan, A. (2001) · Cited by 286
Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?
Arikan, G. G. (2004) · International Tax and Public Finance · doi:10.1023/b:itax.0000011399.00053.a1 · Cited by 276
Cai, H., & Treisman, D. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00220-7 · Cited by 247
Self-citationUsing Micro-Surveys to Measure and Explain Corruption
Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2006) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.009 · Cited by 211
Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Political Corruption in Emerging Markets
Goldsmith, A. A. (1999) · The American Journal of Economics and Sociology · doi:10.1111/j.1536-7150.1999.tb03398.x · Cited by 199
The Effects of Urban Concentration on Economic Growth
Henderson, J. V. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7503 · Cited by 186
Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy
Myerson, R. B. (2006) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00000002 · Cited by 181
Fiscal Decentralization and Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis
de Mello, L. R., & Barenstein, M. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.879574 · Cited by 167
Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silane, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8890 · Cited by 154
How Well Do Institutional Theories Explain Firms’ Perceptions of Property Rights?
Ayyagari, M., Demirgüç‐Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2006) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhl032 · Cited by 129
An international statistical survey of government employment and wagesPreprint
de Tommaso, G., Mukh, G., Schiavo-Campo, & Salvatore, S. (1997) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 90
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G. V., Kaufmann, D., & Schankerman, M. A. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.222210 · Cited by 76
The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh
Olken, B., & Barron, P. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13145 · Cited by 36
Cited by
Natural resources, democracy and corruption
Bhattacharyya, S., & Hodler, R. (2010) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.10.004 · Cited by 695
Realising REDD+: national strategy and policy options
A., A., M., B., M., K., E., S., W.D., S., S., W.-K., & (eds.) (2009) · Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) eBooks · doi:10.17528/cifor/002871 · Cited by 663
Zhang, B., Chen, X., & Guo, H. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.009 · Cited by 556
THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: A SURVEY
Martinez‐Vazquez, J., Lago‐Peñas, S., & Sacchi, A. (2017) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12182 · Cited by 421
Pan, X., & Tian, G. G. (2020) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.03.005 · Cited by 347
Metadata
- Authors
- Fan, C. S., Lin, C., & Treisman, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-02
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 14-34
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1968384976
- Cited by
- 538
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 67.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.