Matched fundraising: Evidence from a natural field experiment
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present evidence from a natural field experiment designed to shed light on the efficacy of fundraising schemes in which donations are matched by a lead donor. In conjunction with the Bavarian State Opera House, we mailed 14,000 regular opera attendees a letter describing a charitable fundraising project organized by the opera house. Recipients were randomly assigned to treatments designed to explore behavioral responses to linear matching schemes, as well as the mere existence of a substantial lead donor. We use the exogenous variation in match rates across treatments to estimate the price elasticities of charitable giving. We find that straight linear matching schemes raise the total donations received including the match value, but partially crowd out the actual donations given excluding the match. If charitable organizations can use lead gifts as they wish, our results show they maximize donations given by simply announcing the presence of a lead gift. We contrast our price elasticity estimates with those based on changes in rules regarding tax deductions for charitable giving, as well as from the nascent literature using large-scale natural field experiments on giving.
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Citations
Cites
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825 · cited 9×
“Vast sums are donated to charitable causes—in 2002, $241 billion was given in theUS, three quarters ofwhich stemmed from individuals (Andreoni, 2006a).(2) On the other side of the market, charities themselves spend enormous amounts on fundraising. For example, Kelley (1997) provides evidence that fundraisers spend $2…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPsychological Contracts in Organizations: Understanding Written and Unwritten Agreements
Rousseau, D. (1995) · doi:10.4135/9781452231594 · Cited by 3,453
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1652 · Cited by 3,357
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment
Frey, B. S., & Meier, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052187 · Cited by 1,184
List, J. A., & Lucking‐Reiley, D. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/324392 · Cited by 535 · cited 2×
“3 or challenge gift, can influence charitable giving [List and Lucking-Reiley 2002, Rondeau and List 2003, Landry et al 2006, Potters et al 2007].”
BackgroundDoes Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment
Karlan, D., & List, J. A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.1774 · Cited by 519 · cited 3×
“…across treatments, which are almost double those in comparable large-scale natural field experiments on charitable giving [Eckel and Grossman 2006, Karlan and List 2007].15 Indeed, a rule of thumb used by charitable organizations is to expect response rates to mail solicitations of between .5%…”
BackgroundMethodDo people behave in experiments as in the field?—evidence from donations
Benz, M., & Meier, S. (2008) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-007-9192-y · Cited by 428
Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund‐Raising
Andreoni, J. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250044 · Cited by 398 · cited 1×
“…presence of the lead donor–even absent any matching offer–may serve either as a coordination device to avoid a Nash equilibrium in which no donors give [Andreoni 1998], or as signal of project quality [Rose-Ackerman 1986, Glazer and Konrad 1996, Vesturlund 2003, Andreoni 2006b, Potters et al 2007].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Huck, S., & Rasul, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-06
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 5-6
- Pages
- 351-362
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2117437094
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 17.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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