The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement: Evidence from a natural experiment in China
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Citations
Cites
Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
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Metadata
- Authors
- Chen, S. X.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2017-03
- Volume
- 147
- Pages
- 62-76
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2579100359
- Cited by
- 299
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 34.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.