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Cited by 52Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

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Konrad, Kai A., Morath, Florian·2012·Journal of Theoretical Biology
DOI 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.04.013
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Abstract

We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.

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  • Traits such as vengefulness, aggression, risk-seeking, selfishness, dishonesty, deception, and spitefulness towards out-groups could be selected for in ML systems trained in more competitive multi-agent settings.

    “Such traits could also be selected for in ML systems that are trained in more competitive multi-agent settings.”

    From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (2025) · cites this paper as Konrad & Morath, 2012

    The Conclusions (page unavailable) show that in-group altruism and out-group spite can be evolutionarily stable when two groups compete. The paper does not establish selection for the other listed traits or examine ML systems trained in competitive multi-agent settings; that application is an extrapolation. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cited by

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Authors
Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F.
Affiliations
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (DE)
Corresponding author
Konrad, Kai A.
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2012-08
Volume
306
Pages
61-67
ISSN
0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.04.013
OpenAlex
W2268820423
Cited by
52
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 2
FWCI
18.05
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Theoretical Biology (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Munich Reprints in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Open access LMU (Ludwid Maxmilian's Universitat Munchen) (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
  • Universitätsbibliothek der LMU
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
in-group favoritism, intergroup conflict, evolutionary stability, group conflict
MeSH terms
Altruism, Conflict, Psychological, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Group Processes, Humans, Models, Genetic

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